132 LIFE OF PROFESSOR HUXLEY CHAP. V 



performed by animals, and even by men, deprived of 

 consciousness, and therefore of volition, is at least 

 compatible with the theory of automatism in animals, 

 although the doctrine of continuity forbids the belief 

 that "such complex phenomena as those of conscious- 

 ness first make their appearance in man." And if 

 the volitions of animals do not enter into the chain 

 of causation of their actions at all, the fact lays at 

 rest the question, "How is it possible to imagine 

 that volition, which is a state of consciousness, and, 

 as such, has not the slightest community of nature 

 with matter in motion, can act upon the moving 

 matter of which the body is composed, as it is assumed 

 to do in voluntary acts ? " 



As for man, the argumentation, if sound, holds 

 equally good. States of consciousness are immedi- 

 ately caused by molecular changes of the brain-sub- 

 stance, and our mental conditions are simply the 

 symbols in consciousness of the changes which take 

 place automatically in the organism. 



As for the bugbear of the "logical consequences" 

 of this conviction, "I may be permitted to remark 

 (he says), that logical consequences are the scarecrows 

 of fools and the beacons of wise men." And if St. 

 Augustine, Calvin, and Jonathan Edwards have held 

 in substance the view that men are conscious auto- 

 mata, to hold this view does not constitute a man a 

 fatalist, a materialist, nor an atheist. And he takes 

 occasion once more to declare that he ranks among 

 none of these philosophers. 



