1878 THE BACONIAN METHOD 237 



published, and that his subsequent Exercitatio displays 

 no trace of being influenced by Bacon's work. After 

 glancing at the superstitious reverence for the 

 " Baconian Induction," he pointed out Bacon's ignor- 

 ance of the progress of science up to his time, and 

 his inability to divine the importance of what he 

 knew by hearsay of the work of Copernicus, or 

 Kepler, or Galileo; of Gilbert, his contemporary, or 

 of Galen; and wound up by quoting Ellis's severe 

 judgment of Bacon in the General Preface to the 

 Philosophic Works, in Spedding's classical edition 

 (p. 38) : " That his method is impracticable cannot, 

 I think, be denied, if we reflect, not only that it 

 never has produced any result, but also that the 

 process by which scientific truths have been established 

 cannot be so presented as even to appear to be in 

 accordance with it." 



How early this conviction had forced itself upon 

 him, I cannot say; but it was certainly not later 

 than 1859, when the Origin of Species was constantly 

 met with " Oh, but this is contrary to the Baconian 

 method." He had long felt what he expresses most 

 clearly in the "Progress of Science" (Coll. Ess. i. 

 46-57), that Bacon's " majestic eloquence and fervid 

 vaticinations," which "drew the attention of all the 

 world to the ' new birth of Time,' " were yet, for all 

 practical results on discovery, "a magnificent failure." 

 The desire for "fruits" has not been the great motive 

 of the discoverer; nor has discovery waited upon 

 collective research. " Those who refuse to go beyond 



