CHAP. XIV.] SCIENCE AND FREE WILL. 441 



science to the question, we are the better prepared to inquire 

 what is meant by determination and what by free will. 



No one, I suppose, would assign to free will a more than 

 infinitesimal range. No leopard can change his spots, nor 

 can any one by merely wishing it, or, as some say, willing 

 it, introduce discontinuity into his course of existence. Our 

 free will at the best is like that of Lucretius's atoms, 

 which at quite uncertain times and places deviate in an 

 uncertain manner from their course. In the course of this 

 our mortal life we more or less frequently find ourselves on 

 a physical or moral watershed, where an imperceptible devia- 

 tion is sufficient to determine into which of two valleys we 

 shall descend. The doctrine of free will asserts that in some 

 such cases the Ego alone is the determining cause. The 

 doctrine of Determinism asserts that in every case, without 

 exception, the result is determined by the previous conditions 

 of the subject, whether bodily or mental, and that Ego is 

 mistaken in supposing himself in any way the cause of the 

 actual result, as both what he is pleased to call decisions 

 and the resultant action are corresponding events due to 

 the same fixed laws. Now, when we speak of causes and 

 effects, we always imply some person who knows the causes 

 and deduces the effects. Who is this person ? Is he a 

 man, or is he the Deity ? 



If he is man, that is to say, a person who can make 

 observations with a certain finite degree of accuracy, we have 

 seen that it is only in certain cases that he can predict 

 results with even approximate correctness. 



If he is the Deity, I object to any argument founded on 

 a supposed acquaintance with the conditions of Divine fore- 

 knowledge. 



The subject of the essay is the relation to determinism, 

 not of theology, metaphysics, or mathematics, but of physical 

 science, the science which depends for its material on the 

 observation and measurement of visible things, but which 

 aims at the development of doctrines whose consistency with 

 each other shall be apparent to our reason. 



