x.] M& DARWIWS CRITICS. 257 



pleasures and pains. A priori, I have nothing to say 

 against this proposition. Admitting its truth, I do not 

 see how the moral faculty is on a different footing from 

 any of the other faculties of man. If I choose to say 

 that it is an immutable and eternal law of human nature 

 that " ginger is hot in the mouth," the assertion has as 

 much foundation of truth as the other, though I think it 

 would be expressed in needlessly pompous language. I 

 must confess that I have never been able to understand 

 why there should be such a bitter quarrel between the 

 intuitionists and the utilitarians. The intuitionist is, after 

 all, only a utilitarian who believes that a particular class 

 of pleasures and pains has an especial importance, by 

 reason of its foundation in the nature of man, and its 

 inseparable connection with his very existence as a 

 thinking being. And as regards the motive of personal 

 affection : Love, as Spinoza profoundly says, is the asso- 

 ciation of pleasure with that which is loved. 1 Or, to 

 put it to the common sense of mankind, is the gratifica- 

 tion of affection a pleasure or a pain ? Purely a pleasure. 

 So that whether the motive which leads us to perform 

 an action is the love of our neighbour, or the love of God, 

 it is undeniable that pleasure enters into that motive. 



Thus much in reply to Mr. Mivart's arguments. I 

 cannot but think that it is to be regretted that he ekes 

 them out by ascribing to the doctrines of the philo- 

 sophers with whom he does not agree, logical con- 

 sequences which have been over and over again proved 

 not to flow from them : and when reason fails him, tries 

 the effect of an injurious nickname. According to the 

 views of Mr. Spencer, Mr. Mill, and Mr. Darwin, Mr. 

 Mivart tells us, " virtue is a mere kind of retrieving ;." 

 and, that we may not miss the point of the joke, he 



1 " Nerape, Amor nihil aliud est, quam Laetitia, concomitante idea causas 

 externae." Ethices, III. xiii. 



