xii.] THE METAPHYSICS OF 



Nor will any effort of the imaginafR 

 believe that the pain is not in my finger. 



And yet nothing is more certain than that it is not, 

 and cannot be, in the spot in which I feel it, nor within 

 a couple of feet of that spot. For the skin of the finger 

 is connected by a bundle of fine nervous fibres, which 

 run up the whole length of the arm, with the spinal 

 marrow and brain, and we know that the feeling of pain 

 caused by the prick of a pin is dependent on the integrity 

 of those fibres. After they have been cut through close 

 to the spinal cord, no pain will be felt, whatever injury 

 is done to the finger ; and if the ends which remain in 

 connection with the cord be pricked, the pain which 

 arises will appear to have its seat in the finger just as 

 distinctly as before. Nay, if the whole arm be cut off, 

 the pain which arises from pricking the nerve stump will 

 appear to be seated in the fingers, just as if they were 

 still connected with the body. 



It is perfectly obvious, therefore, that the. localization 

 of the pain at the surface of the body is an act of the 

 mind. It is an extradition of that consciousness, which 

 has its seat in the brain, to a definite point of the 

 body which takes place without our volition, and may 

 give rise to ideas which are contrary to fact. We might 

 call this extradition of consciousness a reflex feeling, 

 just as we speak of a movement which is excited apart 

 from, or, contrary to, our volition, as a reflex motion. 

 Locality is no more in the pin than pain is ; of the 

 former, as of the latter, it is true that " its being is to 

 be perceived," and that its existence apart from a think- 

 ing mind is not conceivable. 



The foregoing reasoning will be in no way affected, if, 

 instead of pricking the finger, the point of the pin rests 

 gently against it, so as to give rise merely to a tactile 

 sensation. The tactile sensation is referred outwards to 



