XIL] THE METAPHYSICS OF SENSATION. 307 



ance, and thence to that of solidity, in the sense of 

 impenetrability. 



4. The sense of touch gives rise to the idea of " out- 

 ness," in the sense of distance in the third dimension, 

 and thence to that of space, or geometrical solidity. 



5. The sense of sight gives rise to ideas of extension, 

 of figure, magnitude, and motion. 



6. The sense of sight does not give rise to the idea of 

 " outness/' in the sense of distance in the third dimen- 

 sion, nor to that of geometrical solidity, no visual idea 

 appearing to be without the mind, or at any distance 

 off (H 43, 50). 



7. The sense of sight does not give rise to the idea of 

 mechanical solidity. 



8. There is no likeness whatever between the tactile 

 ideas called extension, figure, magnitude, and motion, 

 and the visual ideas which go by the same names ; nor 

 are any ideas common to the two senses. 



9. When we think we see objects at a distance, what 

 really happens is that the visual picture suggests that the 

 object seen has tangible distance ; we confound the strong 

 belief in the tangible distance of the object with actual 

 sight of its distance. 



10. Visual ideas, therefore, constitute a kind of 

 language, by which we are informed of the tactile 

 ideas which will, or may, arise in us. 



Taking these propositions into consideration seriatim, 

 it may be assumed that everyone will assent to the first 

 and second ; and that for the third and fourth we have 

 only to include the muscular sense under the name of 

 sense of touch, as Berkeley did, in order to make it quite 

 accurate. Nor is it intelligible to me that anyone should 

 explicitly deny the truth of the fifth proposition, though 

 some of Berkeley's supporters, less careful than himself, 

 have done so. Indeed, it must be confessed that it is 



