EVOLUTION AND SOCIOLOGY 63 



things, but also on the things of Others," there is 

 no rational sanction for morality. And he finds 

 no such precept. There is none in Nature. There 

 is none in Reason. Nature can only point him to a 

 strenuous rivalry as the one condition of continued 

 progress ; Reason can only endorse the verdict. 

 Hence he breaks at once with reason and with 

 Nature, and seeks an " ultra-rational sanction " for 

 the future course of social progress. 



Here, in his own words, is the situation. " The 

 teaching of reason to the individual must always 

 be that the present time and his own interests 

 therein are all-important to him. Yet the forces 

 which are working out our development are pri- 

 marily concerned not with those interests of the 

 individual, but with those widely different interests 

 of a social organism subject to quite other condi- 

 tions and possessed of an indefinitely longer life. 

 . . . The central fact with which we are con- 

 fronted in our progressive societies is, therefore, 

 that the interests of the social organism and those 

 of the individuals comprising it at any time are 

 actually antagonistic ; they can never be reconciled ; 

 they are inherently and essentially irreconcilable."^ 

 Observe the extraordinary dilemma. Reason not 

 only has no help for the further progress of 

 ^Op. cit, p. 78. 



