Relations between the Physical and the Moral. 251 



into the unknown, which is absurd. And if they are what they 

 are supposed to be by those who identify them with their symbols, 

 then the difficulty of translating units of feeling into them is insur- 

 mountable ; if force, as it objectively exists, is absolutely alien in 

 nature from that which exists subjectively as feeling, then the 

 transformation of force into feeling is unthinkable. Either way, 

 therefore, it is impossible to interpret inner existence in terms of 

 outer existence. But if, on the other hand, units of force, as 

 they exist objectively, are essentially the same in nature with 

 those manifested subjectively as units of feeling, then a con- 

 ceivable hypothesis remains open. Every element of that aggre- 

 gate of activities constituting a consciousness, is known as be- 

 longing to consciousness only by its cohesion with the rest. 

 Beyond the limits of this coherent aggregate of activities exist 

 activities quite independent of it, and which cannot be brought 

 into it. We may imagine, then, that by their exclusion from the 

 circumscribed activities constituting consciousness, these outer 

 activities, though of the same intrinsic nature, become antithe- 

 tically opposed in aspect. Being disconnected from consciousness, 

 or cut off by its limits, they are thereby rendered foreign to it 

 Not being incorporated with its activities, or linked with these as 

 they are with one another, consciousness cannot, as it were, run 

 through them ; and so they come to be figured as unconscious 

 are symbolized as having the nature called material, as opposed to 

 that called spiritual. While, however, it thus seems an imaginable 

 possibility that units of external force may be identical in nature 

 with units of the force known as feeling, yet we cannot, by .so 

 representing them, get any nearer to a comprehension of external 

 force. For, as already shown, supposing all forms of mind to be 

 composed of homogenous units of feeling variously aggregated, 

 the resolution of them into such units leaves us as unable as 

 before to think of the substance of mind as it exists in such units; 

 and thus, even could we really figure to ourselves all units of ex- 

 ternal force as being essentially like units of the force known as 

 feeling, and as so constituting a universal sentiency, we should 

 be as far as ever from forming a conception of that which is 

 universally sentient. 



' Hence, though of the two it seems easier to translate so-called 



