338 Heredity. 



under a different form ; and the very act whereby you form your 

 resolution is conditioned, is subject to determinism. There is 

 ground for believing that every mental state is determined by 

 organic conditions, and that consequently it comes indirectly under 

 the laws of universal determinism. Even though you dispute this, 

 you are in no better case, for at least you must concede that this 

 mental state depends on those which precede it, and that it is sub- 

 ject to the laws of association, called into existence by association; 

 but these laws of association are only one form of determinism. 



It has been thought that this difficulty may be obviated by taking 

 the ground that, supposing the voluntary act to be an effect, it is 

 not therefore a necessary effect, and that causality does not always 

 imply constraint, nor, consequently, necessity. To us this explana- 

 tion seems not to go to the root of the question. The problem is 

 not whether motives have or have not the character of coercion, 

 but whether there is, besides motives and determining causes, a 

 spontaneity which belongs to the individual himself. We might, 

 indeed, regard our ideas, sentiments, and passions as forming a 

 system of forces, each of which tends to pass over into action. 

 There would occur between them action and reaction, attractions 

 and repulsions, some of them combining to act in unison, others 

 warring with one another, while others again are mutually neu- 

 tralized wholly or in part. On this hypothesis the voluntary act 

 the final result of a conflict of forces would not appear to be 

 a constrained effect, and yet it would not have even the shadow 

 of free-will. It would be so far from being free that, given the 

 elementary forces, we might calculate the act as a problem in 

 mechanics. If free-will exists, it can only consist in that property 

 of the subject whereby it reacts against the determining causes, and 

 in consequence of this reaction determines certain acts. 



Before we examine more closely this obscure question, which 

 will bring us unexpectedly back again to heredity, let us briefly 

 consider the difficulties raised against freedom of will by the moral 

 sciences. 



Considerations drawn from the general course of history and 

 from the sequence of historical facts are always somewhat vague. 

 The study of social phenomena, classified and computed in statistics, 

 gives a firmer ground for objections. As Quetelet, Buckle, Wundt, 



