92 The Higher Usefulness of Science 



But manifestly even this can be touched at only a few 

 points. 



At the outset I would be clear, beyond the possibility 

 of being 1 misunderstood, that while I am profoundly 

 convinced that biology has a far deeper meaning for 

 morals than either biologists or ethicists usually recog- 

 nize, nothing is more antipodal to my thought than the 

 notion that ethics may be "reduced to" physics and 

 chemistry or even to physiology. Indeed the "nothing 

 but" philosophy of life is, according to my view, one 

 of the direst factors in the present diseased state of 

 civilization. 



Special care has been taken to make the wording of 

 my subject suggest what I believe biology may do for 

 ethics. It is not my idea that biology can displace 

 ethics, but that it can contribute something to ethics. 

 More specifically, I believe biology must assist ethics in 

 the task of making itself more scientific more exact 

 of definition, more explicit and positive in its mandates, 

 more self-compelling in its authority. Wherein biology 

 is now in better position than ever before to serve 

 ethics I must indicate though I can do so only in a 

 very brief, oracular way, for it seems best to devote 

 myself chiefly to some of the needs of such service. 



Probably all who think earnestly on any of the 

 major questions presented by man in modern society, 

 would agree that about the most basal of these ques- 

 tions is that of how a better status as between 

 man the individual and man the member of society 



