Place of Definition, etc., in Philosophical Biology 117 



naturally defined? The definition is natural, but 

 meager. This and not its artificiality is its fault; and 

 from this fault arises the need for the second kind of 

 classification spoken of at the outset. 



To this other sort of classification and the second 

 meaning of the word man, we now turn. Logic lays 

 great stress on the difference between extension and 

 intension in the meaning of names. When the word 

 man is merely thought of as applying to the individuals 

 of the human species, its meaning in extension is before 

 us. When, on the other hand, thought goes to the at- 

 tributes of man, to what makes him a man, rather than 

 to individual men, it is occupied with the meaning in 

 intension of the word. 



Now, as to our point about the second, the analytic 

 classification of man the analytic meaning of the 

 word man. Let us begin with the reminder that mean- 

 ing in intension is concerned not with the mere naming 

 of objects, but with the attributes of the objects named. 



Let the reader recall that taxonomic research in 

 both zoology and botany has for years, so far as it has 

 been based on morphology exclusively, taken as one of 

 its guiding principles neglect nothing. This means, 

 stated in the terms of logic, that this aspect of tax- 

 onomy has incorporated into its purpose and method, 

 the study of terms in their intension. This is really, I 

 believe, what was in Huxley's mind, at least in the back- 

 ground of it, when he asserted that the second kind of 

 classification is the "same thing as the accurate gener- 



