A HISTORY OF DORSET 



Privy Council then agreed that it would be advisable, but that the inhabitants 

 must contribute to the charge."' The proposal therefore fell through, as 

 did that of 1586, for Elizabeth did nothing for her subjects that they could 

 possibly be made to do for themselves. In a narrow sense the queen's policy 

 was shrewd, for the probability of invasion was obvious in 1587 and the 

 Weymouth and Melcombe people were so alarmed by their helpless position 

 that they were considering whether they would leave the town or bear the 

 cost of defence themselves.'^* They chose the latter course, and in a paper 

 of 1588 refer to the fact that they had built ' a platform' at their own 

 charge.'" From a contemporary plan it seems to have been placed on what 

 is now the esplanade at Melcombe, but it remained without guns.'" The 

 ' block-house ' at Melcombe, often referred to in the municipal records, dates 

 from 1567, and a gunner was appointed in 1568.'" 



There was preparation for war in 1574, when the zeal shown by the 

 leading gentlemen of Dorset caused Elizabeth to send them letters of thanks 

 assurino; them that their ' diligence and forwardness shall be holden in remem- 

 brance to their comfort.''*" No Dorset ship is known to have sailed in 

 Drake's fleets of 1585 and 1587, although men from the county are very 

 likely to have been among the crews. In December, 1587, when the 

 political horizon was very black, military officers were sent into most of the 

 coast counties to advise upon measures of defence ; "' Nicholas Dawtrey went 

 to Dorset, but if he made any report no action was taken upon it. By the 

 following April even Elizabeth was beginning to doubt the success of her 

 diplomacy, and it was thought time to take fresh precautions. Sir John 

 Norreys, a soldier of reputation, was sent round Kent, Sussex, Hampshire, 

 and Dorset to inspect them, and his report on Dorset is dated 24 April.'*' 

 It is not a very illuminating document ; no sufficient distinction is drawn 

 between the small possibilities of landing at such places as Bridport and 

 Charmouth, and the shelter offered by Portland Roads. The Armada carried 

 no invading force of its own ; its purpose was to ensure the crossing of 

 Parma's army by destroying the English fleet, but if it had carried an 

 adequate force Elizabeth and the Council might well have looked on Port- 

 land with anxious eyes. There is no trace in the deliberations of the Council 

 and the soldiers that they ever recognized until the last moment that the 

 junction with Parma was the key to the Spanish plans, and that the strate- 

 gical centre, if attack was awaited, was therefore the eastern Channel, yet 

 Norreys was quite content with garrisons of a few scores of men at Portland 

 and Sandsfoot and a concentration of, nominally, 1,500 men at Weymouth. 

 It was argued that the Armada, riding in Portland Roads, would be exposed 

 to south-east gales, and would therefore not dare to take up the anchorage ; 

 but such gales are rare in summer, and something must inevitably be risked 

 in war. Ralegh, the greatest English strategist of his generation, saw the 

 importance of Portland, and in 1587 urged upon Burghley the necessity for 



'■' Moule, Charters of Weymouth, 154. '" Ibid. 157. 



'" S.P. Dom. Eliz. ccix, No. 94. 

 '■« Ibid, ccxiv, No. II ; Cott. MSS. Aug. I, i, 32. 

 '" Pat. 10 Eliz. pt. viii, m. 28. It is called Weymouth in the patent. 



'* Acts of P.C. 24 Oct. 1574. To Lord Howard of Bindon, Sir Henry Ashley, Sir John Yonge, and 

 Nicholas Turbervile. 



'" Ibid. 26 Dec. 1587. '«> Hirl. MSS. 3324, fol. 42. 



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