THINKING ANIMALS 169 



Without possessing much intrinsic probative value of 

 its own, it is certain that all this fits in very badly with the 

 supposition of a purely mechanical automatism operated 

 by the person making the experiments. And on the other 

 hand it bears a close analogy to the mediumistic 

 " specialities " ; that is, to the well-known fact that one 

 " medium," for instance, is good for " physical effects " 

 (i.e. gives rise around it to dynamic phenomena), but is 

 not good for " psychography " ; or produces " incarna- 

 tions " but not " apports," etc. In the same way, typto- 

 logy or rapping, more or less systematic, seems a funda- 

 mental gift, common to all the various kinds of " mediums." 

 And the fact is perhaps of a certain value that precisely 

 the same thing is true of " thinking " animals ; although 

 we must always remember that an analogous relation may 

 only be apparent or extrinsic. Besides, the tone also of 

 the " communications " in the two fields seems to me very 

 much akin. I allude to the curious, angular, enigmatic, 

 spasmodic, often playful and bantering communications, 

 with frequent " unexpected replies " and philosophic 

 platitudes. I find all these in Lola, and I remember 

 similar stories of Rolf and of the horses, giving me an 

 impression very like that which I get from the accounts of 

 mediumistic seances " with intellectual effects." 



Premising all this, we may suppose that a pecular 

 psychic concordance, which failing a better term 

 might be called mediumistic, exists between Lola and 

 her mistress. The mistress then in some way will 

 have " communicated " through the dog the substance 

 of her psychic self (perhaps with eventual autonomous 

 additions from the canine or other psychic entity) ; all 

 this happening, we must suppose, in a subliminal way, 

 with partial psychical disassociation on the part of 

 the authoress, if not also probably on the part of 

 Lola, about which I am quite certain (and in this I 

 agree with Neumann) that it absolutely does not 

 understand anything or know anything of almost all 

 the manifestations of thought which it exhibits. 



