SCHOOLS 



Llanthony found it necessary to get a royal charter confirming their right 

 to the school (unam scolam in eadem \illa], in the same terms as the charter 

 of King John. 



On 10 April, 13 So, 1 Bishop Henry Wakefield, in a mandate to the 

 archdeacon of Gloucester, recited Giffard's decree, and ' seeing that all and 

 singular things contained in the process and letters were consonant to reason 

 and equity, ordered them to be solemnly published and piously observed, 

 canonically restraining all opponents and rebels by all ecclesiastical censures.' 



In 1410 this school became the subject of a 'leading case'* in which 

 the whole law of schools, essentially a matter of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, 

 was discussed in the common law courts. As the case is of great importance 

 in the history of education and has been somewhat misunderstood * a full 

 account of it is necessary. 



Two Grammar School masters (masters de Grammer Schole) brought a writ of trespass 

 against another master, their count being that whereas the collation of Gloucester Grammar 

 Schole from time whereof memory runs not, &c., belongs to the Prior of Llanthony 

 (Lantone) by Gloucester, and the said Prior had made collation to the plaintiffs to have 

 the governance of the said scholars * and to inform children (Its infants) and others, &c., the 

 defendant had set up a scole in the same town, by which, whereas the plaintiff; used to 

 make of a child 40^. or 2*. a quarter, now they could only take scarce I2d., to their 

 damage, &c. 



Hill, 1 counsel for the defendants, demurred, ' the writ is worthless,' and 

 eventually the demurrer was allowed and the judgement of the court was 

 * that the writ did not lie.' The arguments are set out at considerable 

 length. They show that the real reason why the demurrer was allowed was 

 twofold: (i) because the plaintiff masters had no estate at common law in 

 their office, but merely a ministry or office which depended on the grant of 

 the prior; and (2) 'that teaching and information of children was a spiritual 

 matter,' and therefore the action could not be tried by that court. The last 

 was the main point. Education was a matter of ecclesiastical law, and 

 therefore for cognizance of the ecclesiastical courts, not of the common law 

 courts. Lord Stanley, afterwards earl of Derby, quite correctly quoted this 

 case in a debate in the House of Lords on an Education Bill in 1839, as 

 showing that education was a matter for ecclesiastical cognizance. Mr. de 

 Montmorency in disputing this dogma and maintaining that the case showed 

 that the law of England recognized no restraint on the right of anyone to 

 teach school where he pleased seems to misapprehend the effect of the case. It 

 is true that there are obiter dicta in and during the course of the argument 

 which could be interpreted in the sense urged by him, but they are dicta 

 merely, and did not affect the final judgement of the court. For Skrene 

 having argued for the defendants that there was a good action ' on the case ' 

 and that sufficient damage was shown, William Hankford, afterwards Chief 

 Justice, then a puisne judge, said ' there may be damage without legal wrong 

 (damnum absque injuria}. Thus, if I have a mill and my neighbour sets up 



1 Wore. Epis. Reg. Silvester, fol. 202. 



1 Year Book, 1 1 Hen. IV, 47, case 21. The original is of course in Norman-French. 



1 J. E. G. de Montmorency, State Intervention in English Education (Camb. Univ. Press, 1902), 50-60. 



4 Eicfiolen, but it looks at if it was a mistake for eicholei, schools. The two plaintiff masters were no doubt 

 the master and usher. 



4 Printed Till, not for Tickill, as Mr. de Montmorency suggests, p. 241, but for Hill, who as subsequently 

 .appears was one of the defendants' counsel. 



3'7 



