122 TEE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY 



is in danger of wasting its strength on that which is not significant, and 

 that in studying, for example, the problem of life it frequently forgets 

 both what life itself is as well as how to live. 



It is very distinctly to the former type of mind that Professor 

 Brooks belonged ; for, keen-sighted pioneer and influential biologist that 

 he was, he was also in thorough sympathy with life and the living 

 in all of their aspects, past, present and future, emotional, intellectual 

 and religious. Perhaps for that reason, too, he was the great teacher 

 and the inspirer of men that with one acclaim he is acknowledged to 

 have becD. Technical philosopher he was not, sophisticated philosopher 

 he was not, but sympathetic philosopher he was, and in this respect) 

 since he was biologist also, he was unusual. Contributions to philos- 

 ophy, also, he did not make, but rather, conversely, he let philosophy 

 make contributions to him, and in. this he was again unusual. And yet 

 all the time he was on the lookout in the various fields and aspects of 

 biological science for that which was of genuine significance, for that 

 which had a bearing on some of those great questions whose solution is 

 of paramount interest and importance and which, therefore, are eternal 

 questions. 



These statements concerning Professor Brooks will be made more 

 convincing by considering some of the typical instances in which he 

 brings philosophy and science together. In fact, it is only such in- 

 stances that can be cited; for of system, either in philosophy or biol- 

 ogy, Professor Brooks was quite innocent. Significant and typical of 

 the general attitude which he took, and forming indeed a discussion of 

 one of the most salient problems in biology, physics and philosophy, are 

 the data, the arguments, etc., advanced in Lecture II., entitled " Hux- 

 ley and the Problem of the Naturalist," in The Foundations of Zool- 

 ogy. Here Professor Brooks cites in particular Huxley*s statement: 

 " If the properties of water may be properly said to result from the 

 nature and disposition of its component molecules, I can find no in- 

 telligible ground for refusing to say that the properties of protoplasm 

 result from the nature and disposition of its molecules," and follows this 

 with comments which amount to his taking this position: Huxley's 

 statement can be granted to be valid, but, so granting it, it does not 

 mean that there is or ever can be the possibility of an a priori deduc- 

 tion of the properties of protoplasm from those of its constituents, but 

 that the connection between these must be bridged by induction. For 

 the properties of protoplasm, or indeed those of the organism at any 

 level are not the additive result of those of the parts, but contain some- 

 thing quite new. Thus Professor Brooks indicates the limitations of 

 the mechanistic view of life, limitations which, however, are found as 

 well in the inorganic realm, and which, therefore, demand that in 

 applying theoretical mechanics to nature, either inorganic or organic. 



