CHAPTER II 

 THE STRUCTURE OF MIND 



(i) Consciousness and its content. 



What we know of mind together with what we know 

 of the world in general is derived in the last resort from 

 the sum of that which comes before our consciousness. 

 We experience, , we think, we desire, we purpose. In all 

 thesexases we are or may be conscious, and Tn all there is 

 in ordinary phrase some object with which we are concerned. 

 The phrase is not free from difficulties. It carries associa- 

 tions which are ambiguous and even contradictory. Thus 

 on the one hand it appears as a relative term, implying a 

 subject on which it depends. If there is an object of sight, 

 of hearing, of thought or purpose, there must, it may be 

 said, be a subject which sees, hears, thinks or purposes it. 

 On the other hand, by a contrary turn of association, the 

 object, it may be held, is just that which is independent of 

 any subjective element and in using it we may seem to be 

 assuming a theory of external reality. But as here em- 

 ployed the term is to convey neither meaning. The object 

 is something which we see, hear, think of or purpose, but 

 by calling it an object we do not imply that its existence 

 depends on one of these acts. Nor again do we imply the 

 contrary. All that we do maintain is that the act of con- 

 sciousness has an object. We feel, see, think or purpose 

 something. The former terms are grouped together as 

 acts or modes of consciousness. The < something ' is the 

 object of consciousness. The statement however implies 

 that we can know that we think, feel, etc., which is as much 

 as to say that the mode of consciousness, the act of enter- 



