CHAP, ii THE STRUCTURE OF MIND 19 



taining or contemplating an object may itself become the 

 object of a conscious act. It is from this secondary or 

 reflective consciousness, or if the phrase be preferred, it is 

 from these elements in the objects of consciousness that 

 the beginnings of our conception of mind, self, personality, 

 appear on a first view to be derived. 



This view however may be challenged from more sides 

 than one. In the first place, it may be urged on etymo- 

 logical grounds that the term consciousness is inappropriate 

 as an expression for any direct operation of knowing, 

 feeling or willing. To see or hear is one thing, it may be 

 said. To be conscious that I see or hear is another. It is 

 something that implies two co-ordinate or concomitant 

 operations, seeing and being aware of seeing, and it is just 

 this doubleness that the form of the word conscious 

 conveys. To this it may be sufficient to say in reply that 

 the use of a term is to be settled by convenience rather 

 than by etymology. It is indeed necessary to distinguish 

 the grades of complexity in different contents, and it is true 

 that there is a valid distinction between seeing and knowing 

 that we see. But underlying this specific distinction there 

 is a more fundamental and generic identity. There is in 

 the simple as in the more complex case something that is 

 aware, something that has an object before it in one way 

 or another. We need a name for this something and the 

 name consciousness serves our turn. Consciousness is 

 that which has before it, has present to it, is aware of some 

 object or other. The term serves as a grammatical subject 

 in any one of those sentences. Neither the subject, nor 

 the verb, nor the predicate appear to be capable of further 

 definition in the sense of resolution into simpler or more 

 general elements. They are on the contrary general con- 

 ceptions to be defined (a) by enumerating the specific types 

 which fall within them, and (b) by distinction from allied 

 conceptions with which they may be confused. 



But here a more serious criticism emerges. We have 

 treated < consciousness ' as a subject in a sentence, and this 

 is as much as to imply that there is a distinction and also 

 a relation between consciousness and its object. We have 

 come to know this relation, our preliminary account 



