v INDIVIDUAL EXPERIENCE 75 



position. For perception is essentially a judgment assert- 

 ing something given. Yet its assertion contains somehow 

 more than is given, for the perceptual judgment may be 

 wholly or partially false, whereas what is given qua given 

 is simply fact. Perception may be said generally to assert 

 something given as having its existence in some definite 

 spatial relation, and it is in regard to this spatial relation 

 that error may arise, for instance, in any case of illusion. 

 This reference effected by perception arises from the action 

 of the given on a mind possessing (i) certain definite ten- 

 dencies to correlate its experiences in certain ways, and (2) 

 a certain antecedent experience which it brings to bear on 

 the present from moment to moment. Since the experi- 

 ence is incomplete and the tendencies imperfect as agencies 

 of absolute truth the perceptual judgment may be in vary- 

 ing degrees inaccurate or false. Perception then is not a 

 mere acceptance or awareness of what is given, but an inter- 

 pretation of the given which refers it to a definite position 

 in space and time. Nevertheless perception is a judgment 

 about the given, and thus falls on that side of the line of 

 which we have already taken account, whereas any explicit 

 reference to that which is not given falls on the other side 

 within the world of ideas and ideal- judgments. We have 

 thus to ask how ideas may be conceived as emerging in a 

 mind which is at first concerned with the given. 



The idea is not, as the early empiricists supposed, simply 

 a faint revival of the past experience, for it is unlike the 

 experience which it is supposed to copy. The image which 

 may arise in my mind now of a place which I saw last year 

 might be explained as such a revival. But my memory 

 judgment, c I was there last year about this time,' is an act 

 of quite different character from the perceptions which I 

 experienced last year. It is an act of reference to them 

 or to their objects as something belonging to my past. 

 Similarly, an anticipation which guides my efforts is an act 

 of reference to a possible future. c Revival ' alone will not 

 explain the genesis of this type of reference, but revival 

 operating on other mental elements may help us. The 

 general history of mental development suggests our look- 

 ing for such an element on the side of conation. We may 



