So DEVELOPMENT AND PURPOSE CHAP. 



longer, as in the previous stage, correlated indirectly with 

 its result, but directly aimed at it. Nor is it based on the 

 massed experience of the past alone, but may be correlated 

 detail for detail with the relations of objects as they have 

 been given in perception. We are always dealing with 

 the perceptual surroundings or with the object of desire, 

 and the ideal links between it and the percept of the 

 moment. 1 But in either case we have distinct elements 

 articulately related to one another. If we conceive such 

 correlation repeated continually without any advance be- 

 yond this plane of mental activity we shall have a ramifying 

 co-ordination of the objects and events which make up the 

 perceptual world of the individual, serving from time to 

 time as a basis for the satisfaction of his desires. This 

 world will not be present to consciousness as a system, but 

 any part of it may operate within consciousness when it is 

 relevant to a momentary need, and we must observe that 

 although the objects before consciousness at each moment 

 are particular objects, what is relevant in the guidance of 

 action is that which is common to the existing situation 

 and to others that are already familiar. We have a corre- 

 lation of particulars based on common elements. This 

 correlation may be called Direct (or conscious) and Articu- 

 late. 



(5) Correlation of Universal Analysis and Synthesis. 



The inference from the past to the present or the future 

 is founded on a certain community of character which unites 

 them, and it becomes explicit, and so far rational, in propor- 

 tion as this element rises into consciousness and is recog- 

 nised as the basis of our proceedings. From the look of 

 things I think a thunderstorm is coming on. This is an 

 expectation based, let us say, on my own observations of the 

 weather, in particular it may be of yesterday's weather. 



1 In the human mind, there may be distinct reference to the past at 

 this stage (i.e. without involving general ideas). That is there are true 

 memory judgments as well as anticipations. To verify such memory 

 judgments as distinct from efforts based on anticipation guided by past 

 experiences seems impossible if our evidence rests on external behaviour 

 alone. True memory as distinct from anticipatory ideas cannot therefore 

 be securely attributed to animals. 



