vni CONCEPTUAL RECONSTRUCTION 127 



not a level which thought reached, say, in the age of 

 Parmenides, and left for something higher at some point 

 in the development of modern philosophy. It is a per- 

 manent and necessary part of the reconstructive process. 

 It has its distinctive value and is liable to certain character- 

 istic fallacies. Both the good and the evil live and flourish 

 in modern as in ancient thinking, though, as I shall argue 

 later, it has been the function of modern thought to elabo- 

 rate methods by which we can enjoy the benefit without 

 paying the price. 



2. To appreciate its exact function we must analyse with 

 some care the general nature of the process, the conditions 

 of its validity and the limitations of its value. 



The method, which for the sake of brevity may be called 

 the Abstract, and in its more critical aspects the Dialectical, 

 consists essentially in the endeavour to 'attain truth by the 

 systematic interrelation of concepts subject to the test of 

 self-consistency. It is the method of the bulk of mathe- 

 matical and legal reasoning, while in metaphysics the 

 4 Socratic dialectic ' is its most brilliant example. Its value, 

 its limitations and its dangers depend mainly on the 

 subject matter to which it is applied, though partly of 

 course on the hands into which it falls. In a general way 

 it may be understood by considering its origin. In the 

 formation of the empirical order connective concepts are 

 formed by the precipitation of various elements of experi- 

 ence. The child's conception of a cat is formed and 

 re-formed by many perceptions of soft strokings and 

 perhaps of sharp scratchings, of purrings and mewings, by 

 sensori-motor experiences of cuddlings and perhaps of 

 chasings, by feelings of delight and perhaps of disappoint- 

 ment. The concept is not to be regarded as the actual 

 endurance in the mind of faint remnants of these percep- 

 tions, nor does it consist essentially in their c revival ' in 

 the form of images. We can hardly say even that it is a 

 rallying-point of unity among many perceptions, for in a 

 literal sense the perceptions change and pass, and the only 

 strict unity among them is that of the mind through which 

 they pass. Nevertheless, the concept is formed of elements 



