174 DEVELOPMENT AND PURPOSE CHAP. 



conscious intelligence of the individual. It is correlated 

 with its end, causes and is caused by it. 



Just so far as it is intelligent the purposive act may also 

 have ethical value. He who acts with a purpose c knows 

 what he is about,' and this is the first condition of praise 

 or blame. At this point there are certain incidental con- 

 fusions against which we should guard. In saying that a 

 man or an animal c knows what it is about ' in doing this 

 or that, we must be careful to understand what sort of 

 knowledge we impute. To do this act A with this end B 

 in view is to have a clear idea of B as a consequence of A. 

 It is not necessarily to appreciate all the implications of 

 the act. In particular, it does not imply the conscious 

 application of a general principle, still less of any system 

 of conduct. When a bird procures food for its young or 

 a dog flies to the defence of his friend, we can justly praise 

 the act because it is done with a purpose conforming to 

 our standard of what is praiseworthy. We need not with- 

 hold our praise because we deny to the animal any appre- 

 hension of that standard as such. It is sufficient that it 

 purposes the individual result of its individual act. But 

 it may be asked, can we not at this rate go a step lower 

 down and praise blind impulse too if it works out to effects 

 which we hold good ? The answer is that at the level of 

 impulse the suggestions of praise and blame have no effect, 

 and methods of punishment, if they effect anything, do so 

 not by suggestion, 1 but by the quasi-mechanical influence 

 of repeated experiences of pleasure and pain. For, where 

 ideas of that which is not yet actual can be attached to the 



1 Conversely, the chiding tone that checks a dog's impulse in full career 

 operates through the suggestion of consequences, and a dog may be seen 

 wavering between the two ends or seeking to carry out his congenital 

 impulse while yet avoiding the results of his master's displeasure. It is 

 of course conceivable that in any individual instance a tone or gesture 

 should have acquired by assimilation direct inhibitory effect without 

 suggesting consequences. Whether this explanation can in fact be applied 

 to the successful and many-sided discipline of the higher domestic 

 animals runs back into the question discussed above (Chap. V. p. 77). 

 We are concerned here with the discrimination of stages as such, and 

 our point is that true praise and blame conceived in their most elementary 

 orm as suggestive of reward or punishment operate through ideas, and 

 are therefore appropriate only when ideas can influence action. 



