x THE WILL IN DEVELOPMENT 199 



harmony of life. General happiness would be possible in 

 lives so lived but in no other, as any other is, so far as it 

 is effective, self-destructive. Happiness, then, has as its 

 content a life of a fullness conditioned by harmony, (c) But 

 harmony, we have remarked, means mutual support or 

 furtherance. Two or more functions or forms of life are 

 in harmony so far as they tend to maintain and further one 

 another. Hence, in so far as feeling harmonises with 

 impulse it tends to strengthen that impulse, and, similarly, 

 all sides of personality are thus increased in scope and 

 intensity so far as they harmonise. At the same time 

 insistence on harmony, that is the practical reason, aims at 

 extirpating whatever it cannot reconcile with a harmonious 

 order. Harmony tends to fullness of life, to complete 

 development of personality, though it also limits this 

 development in any individual by the condition that his 

 activity must be such as to promote the development of 

 others. Thus a harmonious development of man in 

 society forms the one aspect of the ethical ideal as the 

 universal happiness forms the other, the two being related 

 as the content of feeling to feeling itself. Both those who 

 have insisted on happiness and those who have insisted on 

 self-realisation have expressed the truth, though it would 

 seem in each case with too much emphasis on one side. 

 The Harmonious development of Mind is at once the 

 substance of general happiness and the end of rational 

 action. 



Thus in modern thought the problem of the relations 

 between the individual and society breaks up into several 

 distinct but related problems. On the one hand there are 

 the rights and duties of the individual giving occasion for 

 internal conflict. On the other hand there is the contrast 

 between the actual social order and the true conditions of 

 social welfare, and this contrast necessarily complicates the 

 resulting problem, which is that of the mutual claims of 

 the individual and society. In general the solution to 

 which modern thought has tended lies in the conception of 

 the ethical order as a realisable harmony of many-sided 

 development. Rights are essentially conditions of develop- 

 ment, duties are conditions of harmony, so that both are 



