ii SCIENTIFIC RECONSTRUCTION 267 



ment of proof to recognise the existence of self-evident 

 first principles, to trace other thoughts, judgments or 

 affirmations if we can back to these, but to treat the prin- 

 ciples themselves as self-evident. But this method has its 

 weaknesses. To begin with, self-evidence is a term of 

 doubtful import. Taken quite literally, it suggests that 

 the evidence is in the truth itself, and that it is an objective 

 quality, say, of a relation between two terms which the 

 truth expresses. If any truths were so stamped or hall- 

 marked with inherent certainty and primacy, they would, 

 indeed, occupy a peculiar position. But the bare concep- 

 tion of ' evidence ' implies a mind which is convinced. 

 Even if the hall-mark were there, it would not be a mark 

 of self-evidence unless there were a mind to which it 

 appealed. If so, two factors at least go to the composition 

 of self-evidence. It is not the simple and unanalysable 

 thing that it appears, but depends (a) on the character of 

 the relation asserted, (b) on the mental make-up of the 

 thinker who forms or accepts the assertion. Now the 

 mental make-up may be affected by much that is external 

 and accidental. In the judgment of value in particular it 

 is coloured by emotional elements, prejudices, interests, 

 sympathies and antipathies that together form a very com- 

 posite whole. This whole may react upon a very simple 

 proposition with an affirmation or rejection of luminous 

 intensity, endowing the response with a strong feeling of 

 subjective certitude. But this felt certitude felt by the 

 mind in making the affirmation as due wholly to the 

 intrinsic character of that which is affirmed will, in fact, 

 be attributable to an intricate maze of psychological forces, 

 and to assume that those forces necessarily guide the mind 

 to truth is to take a great deal for granted. 



Owing to the psychological complexity underlying felt 

 certitude people do, in fact, differ largely in their opinions 

 as to what is self-evident. To some, for example, the exist- 

 ence of God and the immortality of the soul appear as 

 certain as their own existence. To others, both affirma- 

 tions appear highly disputable. About virtue, duty and 

 the good conflicting propositions have been taken by 

 different people as accurate. These divergencies are often 



