iv MECHANISM AND TELEOLOGY 325 



from case to case, is the same in principle. It is quite 

 another matter when the principle of combination differs 

 from one instance to another. In a simple purposive 

 action, such as that which we first took as an illustration of 

 purpose, where I require a book which I remember to have 

 left in a particular place and go to fetch it, my memory, 

 which, mechanically interpreted, must be some deposit of 

 the effect of my previous dealing with the book in my 

 brain, is so combined with my need and my physical sur- 

 roundings as to discharge in succession the actions appro- 

 priate to fetching the book. This deposit complex 

 enough in that it must have its exact point to point corre- 

 spondences with the several physical relations of the rooms 

 of the house, etc. is only one among the millions of 

 deposits that my experience has formed. Yet provision 

 must be made for selecting it out of them, and bringing it, 

 and none other, to bear upon the physical tension, which 

 may be supposed to correspond to my felt need, and thereby 

 to effect the successive discharge of a complex series of 

 actions. If we try to formulate a general plan for effecting 

 such selection and correlation, we find ourselves speaking 

 of a state of want, picking out from experience whatever is 

 relevant to its satisfaction, and guiding action accordingly. 

 But though we might find terms other than these which 

 would avoid all reference to feeling or consciousness, the 

 explanation would imply that there exists a something 

 determined in its actions by their relation to their results, 

 i.e. something purposive. Abstract the notion of the rele- 

 vancy of means to end, and the bottom of the whole pro- 

 ceeding tumbles out. In short, in the activity which we 

 claim as purposive, we find repeatedly that one factor of our 

 fife (e.g. an experience) may be brought to bear upon 

 another (e.g. a want) in a manner that varies indefinitely 

 from case to case. The only principle uniting the other- 

 wise unique combinations is that of the relevance of the 

 combination to the end. Admit this principle, and we 

 recognise a structure determined by purpose. Deny it,, 

 and we have no general plan to explain the unique 

 combinations. Either horn of the dilemma excludes 

 mechanism. 



