iv MECHANISM AND TELEOLOGY 329 



is purposive or mechanical becomes under our definition a 

 question to be settled without prejudice by induction. If 

 the multiform variations of process in a self-adapting living 

 being can be explained as the result of a complex co-ordina- 

 tion of elements, let them be so explained. But if they 

 cannot be so explained, let it not be assumed that the 

 explanation must be sought on those lines or be for ever 

 unattainable. 1 



1 In this account the living being is regarded as a system of what must 

 be called forces, in which mechanical relations are qualified by teleolo- 

 gical relations. When these two sets of relations are hypostatised as 

 Mind and Body they become two substances, and in place of a system 

 whose mode of action as a whole departs from that of mechanical systems 

 in virtue of its specific quality, we have the problem of interaction 

 between two distinct and separate systems, each with laws of its own. 

 If interaction is admitted, we have the conception of body as a purely 

 mechanical system, whose operations at a certain point come plumply to 

 an end, while at another point they as plumply begin, the intervening 

 stage being filled by actions within the other system. Body is then a 

 purely mechanical system which does not conform to laws which, it is 

 not denied, are adequately proved for mechanical systems. To escape 

 this conclusion it must be admitted that Mind exerts force and is acted 

 on by force. But Mind was precisely the concentrated essence of that 

 which is opposed to force. Thus the contradiction of a purely mechan- 

 ical system which does not act mechanically is balanced by the contra- 

 diction of a non-mechanical system which does act mechanically. To 

 escape from this dilemma the Parallelistic scheme is propounded, accord- 

 ing to which the mental and the bodily run on side by side in point to 

 point correspondence, but without interaction. This scheme, however, 

 in effect renders the mental element superfluous. A complication of 

 mechanism is all that is required to explain the actions of living beings. 

 On the other hand, the rise of the psychical stream in coincidence with 

 i certain point of the physical, and its disappearance at another point, 

 are left unexplained. 



In point of fact, the actions of living beings are not explicable in 

 mechanical terms, and we are compelled by the evidence to admit a 

 teleological factor. This we are able to do without contradiction if we 

 avoid hypostatising qualifying aspects or conditions of real process into 

 substances. The concept of the mechanical sums up or brings together 

 certain elements of experience ; the concept of Mind certain other 

 elements. But these elements belong to or qualify realities which act as 

 wholes, and may include many more elements which elude not only our 

 observation but any inferences which we can draw from observation. 

 The mechanical and the teleological are then modes in which reality 

 operates. At some points reality appears to operate wholly on mechan- 

 ical lines. At other points, in living beings, its mechanical operations 

 are qualified by teleological factors. At other points, it may be, it acts 



