vi DEVELOPMENT AND HARMONY 365 



account appears to imply a permanent activity of a Mind 

 that is not limited to a single physical organism. For at 

 least so far as our experience and our powers of conception 

 extend, the existence of a Purpose implies a Mind com- 

 mensurate with that purpose. Mind is the permanent 

 we may venture to say the substantive basis of purposive 

 conception or activity. Where we trace germs or filaments 

 of purpose we infer the rudiments of mind. Where a 

 purpose of given scope is plain there is to be inferred a 

 mind of not less scope. If, as we now conclude, a purpose 

 runs through the world-whole, there is a Mind of which the 

 world-purpose is the object. Such a Mind must be a 

 permanent and central factor in the process of Reality, but 

 how in detail its relation to reality in general, and the indi- 

 vidual mind in particular, is to be conceived is a question 

 about which it is best frankly to confess ignorance. 



When we seek to embody the conception of a condi- 

 tioned teleology in some concrete expression, the images 

 that we have to use are drawn from a limited experience, 

 and the danger is that instead of expanding them to the 

 measure of the broad principles which we seek to elucidate, 

 we may treat them rather as cast-iron moulds into which 

 the wider thought has to be compressed. Thus we may 

 picture the process of the world as the work of a Mind 

 moving towards a fuller self-realisation by subduing the 

 conditions which limit it. But if we speak of c a Mind ' 

 and 'a Self' to be realised, the terms inevitably suggest a 

 personality like our own, a mind shut up within a body, a 

 self exclusive of other selves and yet related to them. 

 Pressing this view of unity, we tend towards a Dualism 

 which would be inconsistent with the principles which it 

 intends to formulate. If again we seek to subdue Dualism 

 to the supremacy of the spirit, we are in danger of falling 

 into a colourless Monism devoid of all the life and motion 

 that depend on the interaction of personalities, with their 

 loves and hates, emotions, which must, for their very 

 being, know the gulfs made by seclusion and separate- 

 ness, that they may overleap them. If again, in reaction 

 from Monism, we assert the independence of the organic 

 constituents of the whole, we may drift towards the notion 



