MARITIME HISTORY 



The seas that wash the shores of Britain being at once her main defence and the only means 

 by which she can be attacked, one of the first things to be examined in considering the maritime 

 history of an English county is the accessibility of its coast and its desirability as a landing-place 

 from the point of view of an invading enemy. Marshal Saxe and General Dumouriez, both 

 strategists of reputation, were of opinion that the true way to strike at London was for an invader 

 to land in the Thames. Such a course presupposes a maritime superiority on the part of the 

 invader, and on the only occasion in English history when an enemy was in naval command of the 

 Thames invasion was neither intended nor attempted. France has often threatened invasion, but 

 has seldom or never been in undisputed command of the Channel long enough to carry out her 

 designs methodically and in the best way. Therefore as the British navy grew to an equal, and 

 then to a greater, strength the shortest possible sea voyage had to be accepted as the best in the 

 plans of French admirals and generals, and excellence of strategy sacrificed to the necessity for a 

 short passage. Sussex and Kent, as the counties nearest to the continental shore, and as offering 

 harbours and landing places, were, as well in mediaeval as in later centuries, both peculiarly 

 attractive to an enemy who proposed either raiding or a more serious enterprise, and, militarily, their 

 history should be considered together. Confining our attention, however, to Sussex it is to be 

 observed that in early times it was even more inviting to an invader than in subsequent centuries, 

 when such harbours as Rye, Winchelsea, Hastings, Pevensey, Bulverhythe, Cuckmere, Shoreham, 

 and Pagham, more or less capable of receiving mediaeval fleets, had deteriorated or ceased to exist ; 

 and in cases where these harbours, formerly covered by the sea, were dry land but liable to inunda- 

 tion they became sources of strength instead of weakness to the defence. 



Convenient for attack as is the coast of Sussex, it, like all other coasts, varies in degree of 

 accessibility along its 77 miles of seaboard. Chichester Harbour cannot be entered at all at low 

 water, and at no time is it possible to go in without a pilot. From Chichester to Selsey Bill, and 

 round Selsey Bill to Littlehampton, a chain of reefs, shoals, and strong and uncertain tidal currents 

 render navigation so intricate and dangerous that that stretch of coast is protected naturally. 

 Pagham, as a mediaeval harbour, formed by the remains of the ' fleet ' which once made Selsey an 

 island, can never, at its best, have been of any value. From Littlehampton commences the danger 

 zone. Newhaven is practically modern, its place being taken in mediaeval times by Seaford ; but 

 if such harbours as Shoreham, Hastings, Rye, and Winchelsea attracted an enemy in former ages 

 it must also be remembered that in such times those places were relatively strong and populous naval 

 ports, often able to protect themselves and the adjacent districts. 



Most of the mediaeval attacks on the Sussex ports were for plunder and destruction and with 

 no view to invasion. Later, when ships and fleets were larger, the harbours were not big enough 

 to receive scores of transports, and the attention of the French government was turned else- 

 where. Later yet, Sussex again became part of a danger belt when, after the peace of Paris in 

 1 763, the French ministry, longing for revenge, listened to the Comte de Broglie's advice to ignore 

 ports and throw an army across in small craft to the nearest beach, a suggestion taken up by the 

 Directory and adopted and improved by Napoleon. It is obvious that from a strategical point of 

 view such a course is, even under the most favourable circumstances possible for it, utterly unsound, 

 and would only be followed when it was found that the conditions prescribed by the art of war 

 were unattainable. The threat and the possibility, however, caused some anxious fears in England 

 and some nervous moments in Sussex, the preparations in France showing that east Sussex and 

 west Kent was the region selected for the principal descent. For a flotilla invasion no finer landing 

 place than Pevensey Bay could be desired, although when the troops were once ashore it would 

 have been found that, given equal skill in leadership, the topographical situation was favourable to 

 the defence. Between Fairlight and Rye, also, disembarkation would be easy, with the additional 

 advantage that the flotilla lying inside the Boulder bank would have a certain amount of shelter. 

 Westward of Beachy Head the invader would have been compelled to undertake a sea journey of 

 undesirable length, and to weigh the consequences of the fact that the landing of an auxiliary force 

 there would not be simultaneous with that to the eastward. 



The shore bordering the Straits of Dover, offering the shortest passage to Gaul, must have been 

 the principal centre of any shipping industry practised by the British tribes, while Regnum and 

 Anderida, together with other remains along the coast, indicate the Roman use of the sea. Any 



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