I02 



NATURE 



[November 30, 1893 



Protective Habit in a Spider. 



Mr. R, I. Pocock's interesting paper in your issue of 

 November i6, leads me to place on record an observation I 

 made last summer in the island of Arran. Sitting by a little 

 clear pool in the granite of Glen Sannox, I noticed a spider whose 

 web was spun in the heather which partly overhung the stream. 

 On disturbing her, she dropped on to the granite a few inches 

 above the water, anci running rapidly down, entered the pool 

 and hid under a tuft of weed. After remaining thus hidden for 

 2| minutes, she returned to the surface and, reeling herself up 

 by her thread, regained the web. Disturbed again, she repeated 

 the action, remaining under water if minutes. A puff of 

 tobacco smoke sent her down a third time, when she remained 

 hidden for 2\ minutes. In each case she hid in the same place, 

 and in each case regained the nest by her thread. 



I have placed the spider in Mr. Pocock's hands. He informs 

 me that the species is Epeira corniita, or Y>o^i\h\y paiagiata. 



University College, Bristol. C. Lloyd Morgan. 



THE LOSS OF H.M.S. " VICTORIAN 



FOUR weeks ago the Admiralty issued a minute 

 upon the proceedings of the Court-Martial appointed 

 to inquire into the loss of H.M.S. Victoria ; and also a 

 further minute upon the construction and stability of the 

 ship, and a report by Mr. W. H. White, the Director of 

 Naval Construction, upon such parts of the evidence given 

 at the Court-Martial as throw light upon the causes of 

 the foundering or capsizing of the ship. 



In the first-named minute the Admiralty concur with 

 the finding of the Court-Martial, as regards the causes of 

 the collision with the Camperdown, and the distribution 

 of blame among the officers concerned : — matters with 

 which we shall not now attempt to deal. The other two 

 relate to the construction, buoyancy, and stability of the 

 ship, and discuss facts and questions relating to these 

 points, which demand the careful attention of all who are 

 interested in the efficiency of the Navy. These minutes 

 deal with matters for which the Admiralty is felt to be 

 responsible, and to be, to some extent, upon its trial. The 

 question of Admiralty responsibility for the efficiency of 

 the Victoria, and her power to withstand such a blow as 

 she received, has been hitherto treated and discussed as 

 though it were merely one of who designed the ship. In 

 this case, the circumstances are somewhat peculiar, for 

 her original designer, Sir N. Barnaby, retired from the 

 Admiralty service in 1885, immediately after the vessel 

 was ordered to be built, and before she was even in 

 frame. Many alterations were afterwards made during 

 the progress of construction, and everything considered 

 necessary for safety or efficiency was done by others, 

 during the five years that passed before she was finally 

 completed. Whether the early design were good or 

 bad, the responsibility for the ship as she was com- 

 pleted and commisssioned, and passed into the Navy 

 as a first-class battle-ship in 1890, surely rests 

 with those whose duty it was to watch her construction, 

 and to ultimately certify to her fitness for the class in 

 H.M. service in which she was placed. The question 

 of who was responsible for the design of the Victoria 

 as it first stood, has now little more than an historical 

 interest. That of the responsibility for completing and 

 fitting her out for sea, and passing her into the Navy as 

 a first-class battle-ship, is the only one of real practical 

 importance at the present time, if it be thought necessary 

 to discuss the matter. 



This being the state of the case with regard to the 

 question of responsibility, we can only regard the minutes 

 relating to the buoyancy and stability of the Victoria as 

 the best defence of the ship that is possible. It may be 

 a perfectly good defence, but it is obviously ex parte, 

 and can only rightly be judged as such. Had a Committee 

 of Inquiry been appointed, these minutes represent the 

 case that would have been laid before it by the Admiralty, 

 NO. 1257. VOL. 49] 



and would have been examined from various points of 

 view, and adjudicated upon. The Admiralty has pre- 

 ferred to treat the public as competent judges, and to lay 

 their case before them in a form which bears the outward 

 semblance of a judicial decision. The minutes are, how- 

 ever, upon some points more in the nature of a pleading 

 than a judgment ; while they are, at the same time, much 

 too technical and complex for any but the most competent 

 experts to judge. It is to be regretted, in the interests of 

 the Navy and the country, that the facts and opinions 

 thus put forward are not referred to a competent and 

 impartial body for examination and report. 



Mr. White's report summarises the evidence respecting 

 the behaviour and movements of the Victoria after she 

 was struck by the Catnperdown, and gives the results 

 of calculations respecting the effect of filling com- 

 partments in the neighbourhood of the blow, which 

 appear to agree, in the main, with the reports of 

 observers. The calculations employed are, as he states^ 

 quite simple in character ; and no one who knows 

 the Construction Department of the Admiralty, or 

 the men in it who perform this class of work, could doubt 

 their substantial accuracy. An important point in con- 

 nection with them is, however, the assumptions upon 

 which they are based. Some of these may be more or 

 less open to question ; while nothing is said as to the 

 information the officers had respecting the rapidity with 

 which the Victoria might be sunk if rammed. It appears 

 evident that no one on board imagined the ship could 

 sink, after such a blow as she received, without giving 

 time to close the water-tight doors ; and it appears,, 

 also, that some of the water-tight doors could only be 

 closed by going into compartments into which the sea 

 first obtained access. 



These questions, and the more general one of the 

 light that is thrown upon the efficiency of other ships of 

 the same class by this sad disaster, respecting which the 

 Admiralty minutes say nothing directly, though they 

 imply that nothing unsatisfactory is indicated, appear 

 deserving of close and careful consideration. The 

 following remarks will be devoted to an attempt ta 

 describe how the matter, and the light thrown upon it by 

 the recent Admiralty minutes, strikes one who is 

 intimately acquainted with the ships of the Navy, and 

 has studied the technical questions which have been 

 raised, from time to time, respecting them. 



The subjects treated of in the two minutes now 

 under consideration may be classified as follows: — 

 (i) The nature of the blow received by the Victoria; 

 (2) her after-movements and behaviour up to the 

 moment when she capsized and sank ; (3) the extent 

 to which water found access into the ship ; (4) the effect 

 of the water thus admitted upon the line of flotation 

 and the stability ; and (5) the lessons that are taught by 

 various circumstances attending the loss that have come 

 to light. 



I. The nature of the blow received by the " Victoria.'' — 

 Before the commencement of the manoeuvre that im- 

 mediately preceded the disaster, the ships of the squadron 

 were steaming in two parallel lines, about 1200 yards 

 apart, at a speed of about 84 knots. The course was 

 ordered to be reversed by turning the ships inwards 

 between the lines. The Victoria's helm was put hard to 

 starboard, at an angle of 35^, and the Ca;/!pcrdoa'n's helm 

 was put over to port, at an angle of 28^. With these 

 helm angles the Victoria would turn in a circle of 600 

 yards diameter, and the Cainperdozvn in a circle of Soo 

 yards diameter. A collision was therefore inevitable 

 with both ships continuing at the same speed. When 

 both had turned through eight points, or a right-angle, 

 they were end-on to each other, at a distance apart which 

 was estimated at 400 to 500 yards. It was then seen 

 that a collision was imminent, and the port engines of 

 the Victoria and starboard engines of the Cainperdown 



