November 30, 1893] 



NA TURE 



103 



were ordered to be reversed at almost the same instant, 

 about one minute before the collision, in order to make 

 the ships turn more quickly. Orders to go astern with 

 both sets of engines followed immediately in each ship. 



The Cainpci'-downs speed on striking the Victoria was 

 estimated at 5 to 6 knots, and appears to have been 

 rather less than 6 knots. The Victorians speed ahead at 

 the same time was about 5 knots. The blow was struck 

 at an angle of about 10 abaft the beam of the Victoria, 

 and at a distance of about 65 feet abaft the stemhead. 

 The vertical portion of the Camperdoiun^ s stem pene- 

 trated 5^ to 6 feet into the side of the Victoria, and the 

 point of the ram, which projects 7 feet beyond the 

 vertical portion of the stem, penetrated 9 feet within the 

 bottom plating at a depth of about 12 feet below water. 

 The breach thus made in the side of the Victoria appears 

 to have been 220 or 230 square feet in area ; of which 

 over 100 square feet was below the water-line. It extended 

 vertically downwards 28 feet from the upper deck, and 

 18 feet from the water-line, and was 12 feet wide at the 

 upper deck, and 11 feet wide at the water-line. The ships 

 were locked together for over one minute, during which 

 time their sterns swung together through an angle of 20^ 

 As the blow was struck just before a water-tight trans- 

 verse bulkhead, it appears probable that the water-tight- 

 ness of the division thus formed was destroyed, either by 

 the first shock or by injuries subsequently received, as 

 the sterns of the two ships swung towards each other, 

 while they were locked together. 



2 . The movements a7id behaviour of the " Victoria^'' after 

 beins; struck, up to the 7no)nent when she capsized and 

 sank. — Mr. White gives a clear description of this, which 

 agrees with the evidence of officers on board other ships, 

 who observed carefully what was happening to the 

 Victoria. The force of the blow given to the bow of the 

 Victoria caused it to move over at first 60 or 70 feet to 

 port. The two ships remained locked together about 

 one minute,^ and as the CaDiperdoivn moved astern and 

 cleared the Victoria settled down rapidly by the bow, and 

 heeled towards the starboard side. The bow sank 10 

 feet during the first four minutes after the collision. Two 

 minutes later the water had risen so high on the fore- 

 castle, which was originally 10 feet above water, that the 

 men working there had to be called away. In nine to ten 

 minutes after the collision the sea was entering the open 

 turret ports, 100 feet from the bow and 14 feet above the 

 original waterline. The upper deck right forward was then 

 1 3 feet below water ; the armour-door in the bulkheadat the 

 fore end ofthe upper deck battery, which was open, was partly 

 under water ; and the two foremost gun ports on starboard 

 side, also open, were awash. The forward part of the 

 upper deck was thus submerged for nearly half the length 

 of the ship, and the stern was lifted about 8 feet. Simul- 

 taneously with this rapid depression of the bow and 

 elevation of the stern, the ship was continuously increas- 

 ing her heel to starboard up to about 20', and when 

 this position had been reached, nine or ten minutes 

 ■only after the collision, she gave a lurch to starboard, 

 turned bottom up, and sank by the head. When the 

 lurch began the vessel was steaming slowly ahead with 

 both screws, and the helm was hard over to starboard. 



The speed ahead, due to an attempt to steam slowly 

 towards the land, and the helm being over to starboard, 

 tended somewhat, as Mr. White pomts out, to increase 

 both the depression of the bow and the heel to starboard. 

 Even a very low speed would have a serious eftect, after 

 the fore end of the upper deck became submerged, in 

 forcing it still deeper below water, and in driving water 

 into the interior of the ship through the openings on and 

 above the upper deck. The helm was kept over because 

 the hydraulic steering gear ceased to act very soon after 

 the collision, when it was in that position. The failure 



' Some observers thought two minutes. 



NO. 1257. VOL. 49] 



of this steering gear is attributed to the inflow of water 

 consequent upon the collision. Alternative hand-steering 

 gear, which was available in a convenient position abaft 

 the portion of the ship that was flooded, could not be 

 brought into operation, owing to the short time the ship 

 remained afloat. 



3. The extettt to which water found access into the 

 ship.— A very large portion of Mr. White's report is de- 

 voted to a detailed discussion of the state of each com- 

 partment in the forward part of the ship, and the 

 probability of water finding access into it ; and, although 

 the results thus arrived at are, doubtless, right upon the 

 whole, it is not certain that they are correct in every par- 

 ticular. He appears to go too far in asserting that the 

 evidence given before the Court Martial, respecting the 

 compartments which were flooded, is exhaustive ; while 

 this is inconsistent with the list, given in Table II. of his 

 report, of " Compartments shown by the evidence to have 

 been probably or possibly filled through doors, hatches, 

 &c." Two items in that list, at least, are quite doubtful, 

 as judged by the published evidence, viz. the water-tight 

 compartment in hold on port side, between frame stations 

 12 and 22, and the port ejector tank ; which would hold 

 108 and 35 tons of water respectively. Neither does it 

 appear right to claim, with absolute certainty, upon the 

 evidence as it stands, that the submerged torpedo room 

 was flooded, although it is probable that it was. This is 

 a point upon which further examination of the witnesses 

 might have converted reasonable doubt into something 

 approaching to certainty. 



There are, however, no scientific or practical questions 

 relating to the case that would be seriously affected by 

 proving absolutely that one compartment, or another, 

 about which there might be any doubt, was or was not 

 flooded. Events proved that sufficient water found its 

 way into the fore-end of the ship to submerge the bow 

 to the extent that was observed, and to ultimately cause 

 her to capsize and sink. She would probably have kept 

 afloat if all water-tight doors and scuttles had been closed, 

 and if the entry of water had thus been limited to the 

 compartments that were directly opened up by the breach 

 made by the collision. The ultimate submersion and 

 capsizing was apparently caused by the entry of water 

 into compartments that were not damaged by the collision, 

 through open doors and scuttles ; and the circumstances 

 and causes ofthe catastrophe can therefore be thoroughly 

 discussed whether Mr. White be right or wrong in his 

 conclusions as to the precise number and positions ofthe 

 compartments that were flooded. 



It thus appears, adopting Mr. White's figures in the 

 aggregate — which must be fairly correct in order to 

 account for the facts — that the weight of water which 

 entered the ship was approximately as follows : — 



(i) Into compartments that would have been flooded, 

 in consequence of the collision, if all water-tight 

 doors and hatches had been closed : 75 tons above 

 the protective deck, 330 tons upon the platforms 

 under the protective deck, and 271^ tons in the 

 hold, being 6765 tons in all. (2) Into compartments that 

 were subsequently flooded through doors, hatches, &c., 

 that were left open : 334 tons above the protective deck, 

 353 tons upon the platforms under the protective deck, 

 and 47 tons in No. 7 coal bunker and shoot. (3) Into 

 compartments which may have been flooded, but as to 

 which the evidence is doubtful : 322 tons above protec- 

 tive deck,^ 200 tons upon the platforms under the 

 protective deck, and 143 tons in the hold. In addition 

 to the above about 100 tons of water must have entered 

 the boatswain's and carpenter's stores above the protec- 



1 The compartments into which this 322 tons of water may have entered 

 are the air-compressing room, sail room, chest room, torpedo room, and 

 turret support, and it is pointed out in a foot-note to Mr. White's minute 

 that these compartments are within the limits of the armour belt. We do 

 not understand how this affects any of the points in the case. 



