126 



NATURE 



[December 7, 1893 



dence establishes the fact that water-tight doors, hatches, 

 iS:c. in the Victoria were in good order. It contains 

 nothing which suggests a doubt of the efficiency of the 

 system of water-tight subdivision existing in the Victoria. 

 At the parts affected by the colHsion the subdivision was 

 minute, but doors were left open. According to the 

 established practice of the Admiralty in all classes of 

 ships, the number of water-tight doors is made as small as 

 po=;sible consistently with the essential conditions for 

 working and fighting the ship. ... In conclusion, their 

 lordsh>ps are of opinion that .... the arrangements of 

 water-tight doors .... did not by any fault of principle 

 contribute to the loss of the ship ; but that, on the con- 

 trary, had the water-tight doors,'hatches, and ports ^ been 

 closed, the ship would have been saved." Mr. White 

 says, in his Minute: " No orders were given to close doors 

 until one minute before collision. It is established by 

 the evidence that the doors, &c. were in good order. The 

 failure to close doors, therefore, was due entirely to the 

 insufficiency of the time available, especially in compart- 

 ments breached by the collision." 



The statement that the water-tight doors, hatches, «S:c. 

 were in good order at the time of the collision appears justi- 

 fied by the evidence ; except, perhaps, with regard to the door 

 at the after end of submerged torpedo room, which slides 

 horizontally, and could only be moved six or eight inches 

 when the attempt was made to close it after the collision. 

 Their lordships go on to say that the detailed evidence 

 contains nothing which suggests a doubt of the efficiency 

 of the system of water-tight subdivision. We cannot dis- 

 cover, however, that this question was investigated by the 

 Court Martial. Very complete evidence was obtained as 

 to the exact state of each compartment, and of each 

 opening into the compartments, at the time of the col- 

 lision ; but the general question of the efficiency of the 

 system of water-tight subdivision, which involves that of 

 the water-tight doors and hatches to the various compart- 

 ments, was not gone into. It would appear, indeed, to 

 have been expressly excluded from the investigations of 

 the Court Martial, since it can only be judged in rela- 

 tion to the buoyancy and stability of the ship ; and the 

 Court confined itself, as already stated in the quo- 

 tation given from the Admiralty Minute, to placing 

 upon the Minutes all evidence obtainable with regard 

 to the closing or otherwise of water-tight doors, &c., 

 but did not feel itself called upon, nor feel competent, to 

 express an opinion as to the causes of the capsizing. 

 While it may therefore be true that the evidence contains 

 nothing which suggests a doubt upon these points, it is, 

 on the other hand, equally true that it contains nothing 

 which proves the assertion that the system of water-tight 

 subdivision was efficient. 



One of the weak points in the water-tight subdivision ap- 

 pears to have been the doors and hatches to openings in the 

 bulkheads and decks ; and especially the impossibility of 

 closing a sufficient number of them after the collision to 

 keep the ship afloat. The doors upon the mess deck 

 were all closed ; but this deck was about 3 feet above 

 the water-line, and there was time to attend to the doors 

 upon it before the inrush of water drove the men away. 

 On the protective deck below, however, and on the plat- 

 form in the hold, there was not time to get at all the 

 doors and hatches before the water reached them ; while 

 most of those that were got at and closed appear to have 

 been only partially, and very imperfectly, secured. The 

 plans of H.M.S. Victoria, appended to the Admiralty 

 Minutes, show ten water-tight doors in the bulkheads on 

 the protective deck, at the fore side of the armour belt. 

 This deck is about 100 feet in length, and includes the 

 whole of the area directly affected by the collision ; and 

 there is only one important bulkhead in this space which 



lit has already been pointed out that the closing of the ports would appar- 

 ently have had but little effect, and the Admiralty admit that the ship 

 might still have foundered. 



NO. 1258, VOL. 49] 



does not contain a door, viz. that which divides the cable 

 locker from the fresh-water tanks. On the platform in 

 the hold, immediately under the protective deck, there 

 are eight water-tight doors in the bulkheads, while 

 there is in addition a water-tight door in the bulk- 

 head at Frame Station 35, which forms the after 

 boundary to the space. This was the door which 

 could not be closed when the attempt was made to do it. 

 There is no bulkhead upon this deck in the space referred 

 to which does not contain a door. Besides these doors 

 there are numerous openings, fitted with water-tight 

 hatches, in the decks over the various compartments. 



The Admiralty Minute states that the number of water- 

 tight doors was made as small as possible, in accordance 

 with the established practice of the Admiralty. It would 

 be difficult, however, to fit more doors than are shown 

 upon the plans of the two decks that are below the water- 

 line in the Victo7'ia — the protective deck and the deck 

 below it in the hold. 



Judging by the Admiralty plans, it was only a certain 

 number of these water-tight doors that were fitted so as 

 to slide horizontally ; and some were merely hinged 

 doors, which could only be closed by entering the com- 

 partment in which they were situated, and were secured 

 by a number of clips round the edge of the door. Some 

 of these were upon the most important transverse bulk- 

 heads, such as the two bulkheads which enclosed the 

 submarine mining flat on the platform in hold. We 

 have always considered that arrangements should be 

 made for closing all doors in bulkheads that are essential 

 to the efficient water-tight subdivision of the ship from a 

 deck that is at a safe height above water, as well as in the 

 compartments where the doors are ; and we believe, also, 

 that this is the Admiralty rule — as it obviously ought to 

 be. If doors are fitted below the water-line so as 

 only to be opened or closed in the compartments 

 where they are, they should seldom require to be 

 opened, and never to be left open, unless the bulkheads 

 to which they are fitted are not considered essential to 

 the efficiency of the water-tight subdivision. It does not 

 appear by the evidence, or by the Admiralty Minutes, that 

 a single one of the many doors in the fore part of the ship 

 on and below the protective deck could be closed from a 

 deck at a safe height above water ; because the sliding 

 doors could only be closed, we believe, from the main 

 deck, which does not appear to have been more than 3 

 feet above water at the time of the accident, and was 

 almost instantly immersed. In view of these cir- 

 cumstances we cannot agree with the opinion of the 

 Admiralty that there is " nothing which suggests a 

 doubt of the efficiency of the system of water-tight sub- 

 division existing in the Victoria. It appears, upon the 

 other hand, quite practicable to improve the efficiency 

 of this system by dispensing with some of the doors, 

 and by arranging with reference to the others that 

 every one which requires to be left open for even an 

 instant, without the certainty of some one being in con- 

 stant attendance upon it till it is closed, should be capable 

 of being worked from a deck at a safe height above 

 water. 



Mr. White says that the failure to close the water-tight 

 doors in the forward part of the Victoria has caused sug- 

 gestions to be made that automatic or self-closing doors 

 should be adopted instead of existing arrangements. 

 This suggestion was, he adds, carefully considered long 

 ago, after certain experimental doors had been tried. 

 He is satisfied that the existing arrangements are 

 the best, and that their safety is only a question of good 

 time being allowed for closing the doors. It must be re- 

 membered, however, that when doors can only be closed 

 in the compartments where they are situated, and these 

 are below the water-level, the inrush of water would often 

 effectually prevent the closing of the doors in bulkheads 

 that separate the compartment that is breached from those 



