December 14, 1893] 



NA TURE 



153 



factor of such great importance to the problem, as to 

 make the bare information with regard to the stability in 

 the intact condition comparatively valueless. Whether the 

 provision of stability was ample, in the Victoria,{ox -AX re- 

 quirements,as the Admiralty assert, or is ample in existing 

 ships of similar type, depends almost entirely, as regards 

 the fighting requirements of a first-class battleship, upon 

 what it is when the thinly-plated ends are penetrated. 

 It is quite certain that damage to the ends would soon 

 make demands upon the stability, which necessitate the 

 provision of a large reserve in the intact condition for 

 drawing upon, and that this reserve should be sufticient 

 to cover not merely the heeling effect of water held over 

 to one side by longitudinal partitions, but also the 

 reduction of stability due to loss of buoyancy in com- 

 partments that are opened up to the sea, and the effect 

 of speed of ship upon the quantity of water that might 

 be admitted, and the position into which it might be 

 forced. There is no necessity to look far in order to see 

 that the stability could thus be seriously reduced very 

 early in an action, and might soon become insuffi- 

 cient to enable the ship to be handled and fought as she 

 should be, if not to place her in absolute peril. 



Ihe steps that should be taken " to prevent the recur- 

 rence, under similar circumstances, of the coftditions which, 

 after the collision, resulted in the loss of the ship." — The 

 Admiralty considers that the only step requisite is to 

 issue regulations to the fleet which will ensure " that, 

 under special circumstances, and particularly when there 

 is risk of collision, doors, hatches, &:c. shall be kept 

 closed as far as possible, and men stationed at any that 

 are necessarily left open " ; also, " that under certain 

 conditions arising out of collision or under-water attack, 

 the gun-ports and other openings in the upper structure 

 shall be closed before water can enter and endanger the 

 stability of the ship." Now, everyone acquainted with 

 the Admiralty and the Navy must know perfectly well 

 that this really leaves matters as they were. Officers in 

 command of H.M. ships are quite aware that water-tight 

 doors, hatches, &c. require to be worked in the manner 

 described ; but the difficulty is to do it, in any emergency 

 that may arise, so as to be effective for the purpose. The 

 great number of water-tight doors, the difficulty of pro- 

 perly securing some of them, and the necessity that 

 exists for many to be frequently open in order to carry 

 on the ordinary work ot the ship, makes it practically 

 impossible to ensure that safety can always be relied 

 upon by such precautions. It is true that the Victoria 

 would, in all probability, not have been lost if all the 

 water-tight doors and hatches in the fore part of the 

 vessel had been closed ; but it does not therefore follow 

 that a similar disaster can be prevented in future merely 

 by an order from the Admiralty directing that all such 

 doors, &c. are to be closed in future in sufficient time to 

 keep water from passing out of one compartment into 

 another. 



We would recommend that the number of water-tight 

 doors in the various compartments be reduced ; that no 

 door which is essential to efficient water-tight sub-divi- 

 sion, and is ever required to be left open without attend- 

 ance, be fastened merely by clips ; that all doors which 

 are relied upon for safety should be capable of being 

 closed either by a satisfactory self-acting arrangement, 

 or by appliances for working them from a deck at a safe 

 height above water. We would also call attention to the 

 danger of making the safety of a ship depend upon the 

 complete closing of a large number of small compart- 

 ments. The only arrangement that can be relied upon is 

 one of subdivision into a series of main compartments, 

 formed by bulkheads that are carried to a deck that 

 is high above the water-line, which will be perforated 

 as little as possible by doors, or by pipes, &c. below 

 water. Such an arrangement as that in the Victoria, 



NO. 1259, VOL. 49] 



where the efficiency of some of the divisional bulkheads, 

 which appear to have formed part of the system of 

 water tight subdivision, depended upon the closing of 

 scuttles in a water-tight deck only 3 feet above water, at 

 which the bulkheads stopped, is manifestly untrust- 

 worthy ; and it is impossible for the Admiralty to remedy 

 its defects by promulgating orders to make it work. 



So far as other ships of the type of the Victoria are 

 concerned, the Admiralty does not see that the necessity 

 for any improvement is indicated. We consider, how- 

 ever, as the foregoing remarks show, that the result ot 

 the ramming of the Victoria points clearly to the neces- 

 sity of making the armour-belts longer in such ships if 

 the armour is to be made really effective. This would 

 increase the power of resistance to gun-fire, while the 

 belts might be so fitted as to reduce the injuries likely to 

 be caused by ramming. Water-tight flats at a small 

 height above water, and thin bulkheads above water, are 

 of little good against rapid gun-fire. Vessels with short 

 armour-belts, such as the Victoria and others of her type, 

 might, as has been pointed out, be destroyed by rapid 

 gun-fire without any penetration of their armour ; so that 

 their defensive power is not measured by the resistance 

 to penetration of the armour they carry. They thus 

 belong more to the type that are called protected ships 

 than to that of armour-clads ; and it would probably be 

 more correct to classify them as such. Their names now 

 figure in the list of first-class battleships, and make our 

 Navy appear stronger in this class of ships than it really 

 is. If they were classed according to their real fighting 

 value, the necessity for adding to the number of battle- 

 ships would appear stronger than it now does to those 

 who cannot judge the relative merits of ships. 



Another lesson taught by the Victoria disaster appears 

 to be that the officers of such ships should be more fully in- 

 structed with regard to the probable effects of various kinds 

 of injury than they now appear to be. It is quite certain 

 that the officers of the Victoria never imagined that the ship 

 could sink so rapidly as she did, even with many of the 

 water-tight doors open, or that her safety depended, to 

 the extent it did, upon the absolute closing of so many 

 small compartments. They require to be advised, and 

 to obtain some experience as to the best mode of treat- 

 ment under different conditions of damage. Would the 

 captains of the ships with short armour-belts all know, 

 for instance, whether it would be better or not to admit 

 water into the ends before going into action ? Has it been 

 decided that it would be better to thus admit water, and 

 prevent changes of trim as the thin ends become per- 

 forated by projectiles, or to keep water out as long as 

 possible, and to submit to changes of trim and of heeling 

 to one side or the other as the various compartments 

 were opened up.' The effect of loose water in the ends 

 might be very objectionable if the speed of the ship were 

 changing, or if she were rolling to any extent ; but 

 it would exist as soon as the ends became damaged ; 

 and it is clear that the presence of a large body of water 

 in the long unarmoured ends of some of these ships 

 would be a great source of difficulty in keeping speed 

 and in manoeuvring. 



The general result of the Admiralty investigation, and 

 of the judgment based upon it, is that there is no fault 

 to be found with any single point connected with the 

 construction and arrangements of the Victoria, or other 

 ships of her type, for which those who conducted the 

 investigations, or pronounce the judgment, could be 

 held responsible ; but that the whole blame is due to 

 the one cause with which no one at the Admiralty 

 could be in any way connected, viz. the failure to close 

 all the water-tight doors, hatches, &c. in time to prevent 

 the disaster. In saying this we do not wish to cast any 

 doubt upon the accuracy of the calculations which have 

 been made, or upon the desire of the Admiralty to arrive 



