INTRODUCTION 



" First Principles." He opens with the pro- 

 blem discussed in chapter iii. § i6 of the latter 

 treatise, viz., with the problem of the infinite 

 divisibility and the ultimate constitution of 

 matter. From this problem, a few pages later, 

 he swiftly turns to that of Spencer's chapter 

 ii., on " Ultimate Religious Ideas," and sum- 

 marizes the argument of Spencer's §§ 11-14. 

 The metaphysical conceptions of the Infinite 

 and Absolute are criticised, and our inabiHty to 

 know the true nature of ultimate reality is de- 

 clared to follow from the considerations which 

 Hamilton and Mansel emphasized. Hereupon 

 Fiske passes to the general problem of the 

 nature of knowledge, and reinforces the con- 

 siderations of Spencer's chapter iv. of the 

 " First Principles," on the " Relativity of All 

 Knowledge," by illustrations drawn in part from 

 Spencer's " Psychology," but also in part de- 

 vised at Fiske's own pleasure. The conclu- 

 sion, as restated at the outset of chapter ii. of 

 Fiske's exposition is : " That we can only know 

 that which is caused, which is finite, and which 

 is relative ; " " that we are forever debarred 

 from any knowledge of the Absolute, the In- 

 finite, or the Uncaused ; that we can affirm 

 nothing whatever concerning the ultimate na- 

 ture of Matter or Mind, and that all our know- 

 ledge consists in the classification of states of 

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