INTRODUCTION 



the foregoing quotation indicates. While he 

 probably thus well states the master's true mind 

 as to the application of the famous Spencerian 

 test of truth, Fiske is more explicit, I think, 

 than Spencer, in speaking of this famous test 

 as wholly relative to human intelligence. There 

 might exist some other intelligence, Fiske as- 

 serts, that could conceive what we cannot con- 

 ceive. But Spencer upon occasion says (" Prin- 

 ciples of Psychology," Part VII., chapter xi., 

 § 433, vol. ii., p. 426 of the American edition) : 

 " Reasoning itself can be trusted only on the 

 assumption that absolute uniformities of thought 

 correspond to absolute uniformities of things.'' 

 The theoretical issue here involved is a difficult 

 one, that cannot now be further discussed. But 

 it will be seen that here too Fiske well uses 

 his freedom as expositor. This chapter iii. of 

 Fiske most nearly corresponds to the just cited 

 chapter of Spencer's Psychology. The Spen- 

 cerian test of truth is, however, repeatedly used 

 and illustrated throughout the " First Prin- 

 ciples." 



10. The next chapter, the fourth in Fiske's 

 Prolegomena, discusses the relation of " Pheno- 

 menon and Noumenon." Here he has to deal 

 with one of the most technical and difficult of 

 Spencer's purely philosophical discussions, viz. 

 that regarding the necessity and truth of what 

 xlviii 



