PREFACE 



To the phrase " Synthetic Philosophy," as a 

 distinctiv^e epithet, it is an obvious objection 

 that the systems of Aquinas and Hegel, and 

 other systems built up by the aid of metaphy- 

 sical methods, might claim to be entitled " Syn- 

 thetic'* as well as the system of Mr. Spencer. 

 So far as this goes, therefore, there would seem 

 to be but little room for choice between the two 

 terms. But when we look more carefully into 

 the matter, the case is seen to be otherwise. 

 For not only does the term " Cosmic," when 

 regard is had to the implications of its primitive 

 meaning, convey all that is conveyed by the 

 term " Synthetic," but it further hits the pre- 

 cise point by which Mr. Spencer's philosophy 

 is fundamentally distinguished alike from Posi- 

 tivism and from all ontological systems. For 

 the term " Cosmos " connotes the orderly suc- 

 cession of phenomena quite as forcibly as it de- 

 notes the totality of phenomena ; and with any- 

 thing absolute or ontological, with anything 

 save the " Mundus " or orderly world of phe- 

 nomena, it has nothing whatever to do. So that, 

 strictly speaking, no theological system of phi- 

 losophy can be called " Cosmic " while admit- 

 ting miracle, special creation, or any other de- 

 nial of the persistence of force, into its scheme 

 of things ; and no ontological system can be 



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