INTRODUCTION 



Spencer, in the Psychology, called " Transfig- 

 ured Realism." The thesis is that there is a 

 reality beyond consciousness, and independent 

 of our knowledge of it, notwithstanding that 

 this independent Being, or Noumenon, is essen- 

 tially unknowable. The argument of the chap- 

 ter corresponds, in brief, to the greater part of 

 Spencer's (already cited) extended discussion in 

 Part VII. of the Psychology, in so far as that 

 discussion has not been represented by Fiske's 

 chapter iii. But Fiske gives to the historical 

 part of the discussion a coloring derived from 

 the " History of Philosophy " of Lewes, from 

 Ferrier's discussion of Berkeley, and from his 

 own reading of Locke, Berkeley, and the later 

 classic British philosophers who ar^ principally 

 concerned in this inquiry. Fiske's treatment of 

 Berkeley, while agreeing as to the main issue 

 with Spencer's criticism of that philosopher, is 

 here more sympathetic in tone than is that of 

 Spencer. And here, too, first appears a certain 

 emphasis that Fiske lays upon Berkeley, — an 

 emphasis that enters into his own later argu- 

 ments about the relations of matter and mind. 

 We shall have occasion to lay stress upon this 

 matter further on in our own survey. It suffices 

 at present to say that Fiske explicitly declares 

 Berkeley's analysis of the phenomenal concept 

 of matter to be correct. Berkeley, in Fiske's 

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