INTRODUCTION 



view, erred only in denying the existence of an 

 unknowable noumenal substrate of the material 

 world. But in so far as Berkeley's analysis of 

 the concept of matter is correct, Fiske later 

 uses the results of this analysis to vindicate the 

 Spencerian doctrine from all affiliation with 

 materialism. And while at every step of this 

 process Fiske could insist that he was expound- 

 ing Spencerian opinions, still it was as a con- 

 sequence of this very vindication that Fiske was 

 led to results which finally made his views about 

 the " psychical nature '' of the ultimate reality 

 diverge from those of Spencer. Here, in fact, 

 we find the first indication of that disposition 

 to interpret the ultimate in " psychical " terms 

 which in Fiske's latest period brought him near 

 to the acceptance of some of the formulas of 

 modern constructive Idealism. As to the main 

 thesis of this chapter, it is expounded with great 

 simplicity and clearness ; and Spencer's form of 

 Realism could not be made plainer than is here 

 done. 



II. The extended chapter v. of Fiske's Pro- 

 legomena, on " The Subjective and Objective 

 Methods," corresponds to no one portion of 

 Spencer's exposition, but is a free formulation 

 of Fiske's view of the general logic of scientific 

 and philosophical methods. It is of course in 

 essential agreement with Spencer. It follows, in 



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