INTRODUCTION 



fact, well-known types of modern opinion. Its 

 criticisms of the history of thought relating to 

 method are founded in part upon Lewes's "His- 

 tory of Philosophy," but the authorities are sup- 

 plemented at every point by Fiske's own wide 

 reading. The criticism of the Comtean philoso- 

 phy occupies in this chapter, for the first time 

 in the book, a large space in Fiske's text, and 

 in particular Comte's aberrations of opinion in 

 his final period of work are pointed out. This 

 criticism of Comte was presumably a part of 

 the original course of lectures at Harvard. 



12. The chapter on " Causation," chapter vi. 

 of the Prolegomena, corresponds, once more, to 

 no one chapter of the " First Principles." It 

 is in fact much more suggested by John Stuart 

 Mill, and by his famous review of Hamilton, 

 than by Spencer's method of dealing with the 

 same problem. By Spencer questions concern- 

 ing the invariability of causal sequence are usu- 

 ally treated in the closest relation to the dis- 

 cussion of the Persistence of Force. Fiske, 

 however, although varying the form of treat- 

 ment, keeps in essential harmony with the 

 Spencerian position. He especially emphasizes 

 the impossibility of our discovering what the 

 true nature of causal nexus is, and so uses the 

 discussion to illustrate the relativity of know- 

 ledge. As against Mill, he insists that, never- 



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