INTRODUCTION 



impassable gulf." We shall also see how he 

 combines this view with that acceptance of the 

 Berkeleyan analysis of the phenomenal concept 

 of matter which we have noted above, in §io 

 of this Introduction. The result of the com- 

 bination is a doctrine which stands in opposi- 

 tion to what Spencer expresses in the passage 

 just quoted. Yet Fiske evidently believed 

 himself to be true to what Spencer implicitly 

 meant to say. As a fact, in the last edition 

 of his " First Principles " (1900, § 71 and § 71 

 a, b, f,) Spencer somewhat modifies his language 

 regarding this point. While he does not pass 

 over to Fiske's position, he speaks, neverthe- 

 less, doubtfully as to the " transformation," 

 and asserts only a probability (as against Hux- 

 ley's doctrine of animal automatism) that the 

 state of consciousness is a "factor" in such 

 transformations of energy as occur when volun- 

 tary acts are performed, or when, as in " pas- 

 sive emotions," nervous changes result in pro- 

 ducing conscious states that do not at once 

 get active motor expression. He now admits, 

 however, that this probability does not amount 

 to proof, and that consciousness may be only 

 a " concomitant of certain nervous actions." 

 Fiske, however, remained to the end certain 

 that physical energy and consciousness cannot 

 be transformed the one into the other. 



Ix 



