INTRODUCTION 



" direct equilibration " (that is, through the 

 training of new habits) and through " indirect 

 equihbration " (that is, through further natural 

 selection of the most intelligent social groups), 

 upon the development of the human brain. 

 The more highly developed brain would then 

 become still more capable of those " represen- 

 tative " and "re-representative feelings,'* upon 

 which the higher morality, in the Spencerian 

 view, depends. 



27. Fiske connects with this speculation a 

 consideration of the nature of the various 

 moral motives which would develop upon the 

 supposed basis. He shows that (as Spencer 

 also insists) they are to be distinguished from 

 anything like a direct perception, on the part 

 of those who are concerned, of the social util- 

 ity of m'oral actions. Primitive morality is not 

 due to the conscious discovery that individ- 

 ual happiness depends upon social conform- 

 ity. Nor is the extension of social sympathy, 

 which marks the growth of higher morality in 

 the race, a product of an intellectual process 

 whereby man reasons that the pleasures and 

 pains of others are to him as if they were his 

 own. Parental affection, the beginning of the 

 process, is blind. It is due in great part to 

 the selective value of parental care. Its ex- 

 tension from the early stages of infancy to 

 Ixxxiv 



