INTRODUCTION 



view, in the light of the foregoing analysis, the 

 position of Fiske, in so far as we have yet had 

 occasion to indicate it, we are led at once to 

 see that there may well be a conflict in his 

 mind — a conflict of which he himself was 

 not clearly conscious — between two different 

 kinds of motives that governed him in dealing 

 with these problems. On the whole, to be 

 sure, Fiske has thus far appeared in his treat- 

 ment of ultimate problems as a faithful disciple 

 of Spencer. He has emphasized the essen- 

 tially inscrutable character of the Ultimate Re- 

 ality. He has plainly pointed out what he 

 regards as the vanity of " anthropomorphism." 

 He has indicated that we have no right whatever 

 to interpret this ultimate reality in terms of our 

 own consciousness. Yet, on the other hand, he 

 has shown already a concern which has indeed 

 in his mind a decidedly theoretical foundation, 

 but which has also a strong personal interest for 

 him. This concern is in maintaining, with much 

 greater definiteness than Spencer, that the men- 

 tal and material worlds form two classes of 

 phenomena, between which there is an " im- 

 passable gulf." The cordial acceptance of the 

 Berkeleyan analysis of the phenomenal con- 

 cept of matter, the resulting assertion that 

 physical energy cannot conceivably be trans- 

 formed into mental energy, — these tendencies 

 Ixxxvii 



