THE RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE 



ditioned or determined by any cause. The 

 assertion of self-existence is the denial of causa- 

 tion ; and when we deny causation we also deny 

 commencement, inasmuch as to suppose that 

 there was a time when the existence commenced 

 is to admit that the commencement of the ex- 

 istence was determined by some cause ; which 

 is contrary to our hypothesis. In order, there- 

 fore, to conceive self-existence, we must con- 

 ceive existence throughout infinite past time ; 

 and to do this manifestly exceeds our powers. 



The Pantheistic hypothesis of self-creation 

 is similarly incomprehensible. Self-creation, 

 equally with self-existence, excludes the idea of 

 any extraneous determining cause. If the pas- 

 sage of the universe from non-existence, or from 

 potential existence, into actual existence, were 

 determined by any extrinsic cause, manifestly 

 it would not be self-created. Nevertheless, to 

 suppose that existence, after remaining for a 

 long period in one form, suddenly took on of 

 its own accord another form, requires us to im- 

 agine a change without any cause, — which is 

 impossible. 



Of the Theistic hypothesis, also, we must 

 perforce admit that, whatever may be urged in 

 favour of our accepting it as a help to our think- 

 ing, it is no less incomprehensible than the other 

 two. In the first place, the creation of some- 

 thing out of nothing is a process which we are 



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