THE RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE 



subject. For it is impossible to enter into any 

 inquiry concerning causation without eventually 

 postulating some First Cause. We are obliged 

 to do so from sheer inability to follow out in 

 thought an infinite series of causes. 



Assuming, then, the existence of a First 

 Cause, let us inquire for a moment into its na- 

 ture. The First Cause must be infinite. For if 

 we regard it as finite, we regard it as bounded 

 or limited, and are thus compelled to think 

 of a region beyond its limits, which region is 

 uncaused. And if we admit this, we virtually 

 abandon the doctrine of causation altogether. 

 We therefore have no alternative but to regard 

 the First Cause as infinite. 



We are no less irresistibly compelled to re- 

 gard the First Cause as independent. For if it 

 be dependent, that on which it depends must 

 be the First Cause. The First Cause can there- 

 fore have no necessary relation to any other 

 form of Being ; since if the presence of any 

 other form of existence is necessary to its com- 

 pleteness, it is partially dependent upon such 

 other form of existence, and cannot be the First 

 Cause. Thus the First Cause besides being in- 

 finite must be complete in itself, existing inde- 

 pendently of all relations, — - that is, it must be 

 absolute. 



To such conclusions, following the most re- 



II 



