COSMIC PHILOSOPHY 



of the Relativity of Knowledge. They consti- 

 tute but a small, though an important, portion 

 of the mass of evidence which might be alleged. 

 The history of metaphysical speculation — if 

 we leave out of the account all psychological 

 inquiry, which is a very different matter — is 

 little else than the history of a series of persist- 

 ent attempts to frame tenable hypotheses con- 

 cerning the origin of the universe, the nature of 

 its First Cause, and the ultimate constitution of 

 the matter which it contains. History teaches us 

 that all such attempts have failed ; and furnishes 

 us with ample inductive or empirical evidence 

 that the human mind is incapable of attaining 

 satisfactory conclusions concerning the First 

 Cause, the Infinite, the Absolute, or the inti- 

 mate nature of things. We accordingly say for 

 brevity's sake that we cannot know the Abso- 

 lute, but only the Relative ; and in saying so, 

 we implicitly assert two practical conclusions : 



Firsts we cannot know things as they exist 

 independently of our intelligence, but only as 

 they exist in relation to our intelligence. 



Secondly y the possibilities of thought are not 

 identical or coextensive with the possibilities of 

 things. A proposition is not necessarily true 

 because we can clearly conceive its terms ; nor 

 is a proposition necessarily untrue because it 

 contains terms which are to us inconceivable.* 



1 Hence, as will appear more fully hereafter, we have no 

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