THE RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE 



This great truth, which I have thus illus- 

 trated by a few empirical examples, must now 

 be illustrated deductively. It must be shown 

 how the impossibility of knowing or conceiving 

 anything save the Relative results from the very 

 constitution of our minds — from the very man- 

 ner in which our thinking takes place. And 

 this may be shown by several distinct lines of 

 argument. 



In the first place, all knowing is classifying. 

 What do we mean when we say that any given 

 phenomenon has been explained ? We mean 

 simply that it has been ranked along with sim- 

 ilar phenomena which, having previously been 

 grouped together, are said to be understood. 

 For example, in walking out some clear Novem- 



criterion of absolute or objective truth. But it will also appear 

 that, in the realm of phenomena, with which alone are we 

 practically concerned in forming the conclusions which make 

 up our common sense, our science, and our philosophy, we 

 do possess a vaHd criterion of relative truth in the test of in- 

 conceivability. A proposition concerning phenomena, which 

 contains an inconceivable term, is ipso facto a proposition 

 without a basis in our experience of phenomena, and is ac- 

 cordingly inadmissible. But a proposition concerning nou- 

 mena, which contains an inconceivable term, is entirely out 

 of relation with experience, since we have no experience of 

 noumena ; and we have accordingly no means of judging 

 whether it is true or not. This is what is meant by the state- 

 ment in the text. [On the relation of this statement to Spen- 

 cer' s doctrine of the test of the truth of a proposition, see 

 Iljtroductipn, § §.] 



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