THE RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE 



tion. Manifestly the First Cause, the Infinite, 

 the Absolute, can be known only by being clas- 

 sified. We can conceive it at all only by con- 

 ceiving it as of such or such kind — as like this or 

 that which we have already conceived. There 

 can be but one First Cause ; and this, being 

 uncaused, cannot be classified with any of the 

 multiplicity of things which are caused. The 

 Infinite, again, cannot be conceived as like the 

 Finite ; nor can it be classed with any other 

 Infinite, since two Infinites, by mutually limit- 

 ing each other, would become finite, and thus 

 destroy each other. And likewise the Absolute 

 cannot, without a manifest contradiction in 

 terms, be regarded as sustaining a relation of 

 likeness to anything else. For by the definition 

 of the Absolute, it is that which exists out of 

 all relation. Thus by the very constitution of 

 the knowing process, we are forever debarred 

 from knowing anything save that which is 

 caused, which is finite, and which is relative. 



If we start from another point of view, and 

 contemplate the process of knowing under a dif- 

 ferent but correlative aspect, we shall be driven 

 to the same inevitable conclusion. In order to 

 know anything, we must not only recognize it 

 as like certain other things, but we must recog- 

 nize it also as different from certain other things. 

 We cognize whiteness, not only by its likeness 

 to the whiteness previously presented to ourcon- 



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