CHAPTER II 

 THE SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY^ 



IN setting forth and illustrating the conclu- 

 sion that we can only know that which is 

 caused, which is finite, and which is relative, 

 we have virtually rejected as impracticable and 

 useless a large number of the inquiries with 

 which philosophy has habitually concerned it- 

 self. Both by practical examples, and by a series 

 of mutually harmonious deductions from the 

 mode in which our intelligence works, as re- 

 vealed to us by psychologic analysis, it has been 

 shown that we are forever debarred from any 

 knowledge of the Absolute, the Infinite, or the 

 Uncaused ; that we can afHrm nothing whatever 

 concerning the ultimate nature of Matter or 

 Mind ; and that all our knowledge consists in 

 the classification of states of consciousness pro- 

 duced in us by unknown external agencies. 

 Nevertheless, from the earliest times, philosophy 

 has busied itself in attempts to reach tenable 

 conclusions respecting the nature and attributes 

 of the absolute and infinite First Cause ; it has 

 ever tacitly assumed that the ultimate nature of 

 ^ [See Introduction, § 9.] 

 31 



