THE TEST OF TRUTH 



let us note, there is nothing that conflicts with 

 the establisheddoctrineof the relativity of know- 

 ledge. It will be remembered that in our first 

 chapter the necessary cooperation of subject and 

 object in every act of cognition was shown to be 

 one of those very facts which enforce the con- 

 clusion that all knowledge is of the Relative. No 

 competent psychologist would now subscribe to 

 the Lockian opinion that previous to the recep- 

 tion of experiences the mind is like a blank sheet. 

 Physiology has taught us better than that, — has 

 taught us that mind is strictly correlated with 

 a complex nervous system, which, according to 

 minute peculiarities of organization, modifies the 

 experiences resulting from its intercourse with 

 environing agencies. We therefore recognize as 

 fully as Leibnitz, that the subject actively coop- 

 erates with the object in each act of conscious- 

 ness. And we insist thaty for that very reason^ 

 our knowledge, being the product of subjective 

 and objective factors, can never be regarded as 

 a knowledge of the objective factor by itself. 

 This is, indeed, the import of our illustration, 

 above given, from the phenomena of vibratory 

 motion. Since a homogeneous phenomenon, like 

 the undulation of molecules, can produce in us 

 such heterogeneous states of consciousness as the 

 feelings of sound, heat, of colour, we argued that 

 the constitution of the percipient mind must 

 modify in every case the character of the phe- 



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