COSMIC PHILOSOPHY 



nomenon perceived ; and that, therefore^ the 

 phenomenon cannot be regarded as like the ex- 

 ternal noumenon, its part-cause. What is this 

 but saying, with Leibnitz, that the subject ac- 

 tively cooperates with the object in each act of 

 conscious knowledge ? The Leibnitzian criti- 

 cism, therefore, only serves to bring out in a 

 stronger light the doctrine that all knowledge is 

 of the Relative. Though powerful against the 

 hypothesis of Locke, it is powerless against the 

 position held by modern psychology. 



Such a result, however, was the farthest pos- 

 sible from Leibnitz*s thoughts. Far from in- 

 tending to reinforce the doctrine of relativity 

 as shadowed forth in the writings of the Lock- 

 ian school, his object was to crush it at the start 

 by showing that we can obtain a criterion of 

 absolute or objective knowledge. And he ac- 

 cordingly gave to his statement an interpretation 

 quite inconsistent with the doctrine of the rela- 

 tivity of knowledge as we are now obliged to 

 hold it. He held that in many acts of cognition, 

 the mind contributes an element of certainty 

 which could never have been gained from ex- 

 perience, which could never have flowed from 

 the intercourse of the mind with its environ- 

 ment ; and that propositions obtained by such 

 acts of cognition are Necessary Truths, — truths 

 which are true of the objective order of things 

 as well of the subjective order. 



68 



