COSMIC PHILOSOPHY 



from the necessary cooperation of subject and 

 object in each act of cognition, that a knowledge 

 of the pure object as unmodified by the sub- 

 ject is forever impossible. Kant held that a 

 phenomenon, inasmuch as it is an appearance, 

 presupposes a noumenon, — a thing which ap- 

 pears^ — but this noumenon, which is a neces- 

 sary postulate, is only a negation to us. It 

 can never be positively known ; it can only be 

 known under the conditions of sense and un- 

 derstanding, ergo, as a phenomenon. " And ac- 

 cordingly/' says Kant, " though the existence 

 of an external world is a necessary postulate, its 

 existence is only logically affirmed." Of its ex- 

 istence out of relation to our consciousness, we 

 can know nothing; and it consequently appears 

 that " we can never predicate of our knowledge 

 that it has objective truth." ^ Even so, reiter- 

 ates Kant, in the introduction to the " Kritik," 

 " to attempt to transcend the sphere of the sub- 

 jective is vain and hopeless ; nor is it wise to 

 deplore that we are ' cabin'd, cribbed, confined ' 

 within that sphere from which we never can 

 escape. As well might the bird, when feeling 

 the resistance of the air, wish that it were in 

 vacuo, thinking that there it might fly with per- 

 fect ease. Let us therefore content ourselves 

 with our own kingdom, instead of crossing per- 



^ Lewes, History of Philosophy, 3d edition, vol. ii. pp. 

 471, 472. 



70 



