THE TEST OF TRUTH 



ilous seas in search of kingdoms inaccessible to 

 man/* 



Up to this point we may regard Kant as 

 equally with Hume the precursor of the modern 

 philosophy of relativity. In the above conclu- 

 sions there is little to which Hume would have 

 objected. But when we come to examine the 

 Test of Truth set up by the two great adversa- 

 ries, the point of irreconcilable antagonism be- 

 tween them becomes apparent. Though con- 

 ducted with a wider historic experience, and 

 with more extensive psychologic resources, the 

 combat was essentially the same which had been 

 waged in the preceding epoch between Leib- 

 nitz and Locke. Hume had said, the sole cri- 

 terion of truth is uniformity of experience ; that 

 to which human experience has invariably testi- 

 fied, we are compelled to accept as true ; though 

 it may not be true of the pure objective order 

 of things, it is true for us, — true of the order 

 of things as presented to our intelligence. Kant, 

 on the other hand, distinguished between con- 

 tingent and necessary truths ; and asserted that 

 while uniformity of experience is a sufficient cri- 

 terion of contingent truth, it is not a trustworthy 

 criterion of necessary truth. For experience, 

 says Kant, can tell us that certain phenomena 

 always occur in certain relations ; but it cannot 

 tell us that they must always so occur. Uni- 

 formity of experience cannot assure us that two 



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